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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
This dissertation is conceived to be a contribution to the understanding of 
the Italian “Civil Peace Corps” Concept, as a tool delivering non-violent conflict 
transformation actions of positive peace1, contributing to Human Security 
interventions within National, European and International “Early Warning 
Systems”, Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Operations. It is, anyway, 
not concerned on how to run these interventions, taking into brief account the 
existing framework, into which an institutionalized implementation of the Italian 
CPC concept would find its place, as an instrument complementary to others.  
This thesis is, therefore, aimed to address the following question: could the 
institutionalised development of the Italian CPC Concept be considered as a 
potentially useful tool, in the framework of comprehensive approaches to HS in 
EWS, CP and CMO? The tentative answer is organized in five chapters, giving 
overviews over: the international CA to CM; the Italian approach to a HS CM; the 
CPC concept; the path towards a CPC institutionalisation in Italy; the potential 
usefulness of the CPC in the current system with education, training and 
employment issues, considering also cultural concerns in the background, aiming 
to give an answer to the main question. 
This work stems from a study path paced attending the “Human Rights and 
Multi-Level Governance” Master’s Degree Course at the University of Padua and 
a set of personal and professional experiences, which altogether raised awareness 
about the usefulness of a shared vision concerning conflict transformation, based 
on the mainstreaming of International Law and Human Security concept. 
                                                 
 
1
 Summarizing Galtung’s thought, “Negative Peace” is the absence of direct violence, while 
“Positive Peace” refers to the absence of direct and structural violence, aiming to a wider social 
justice. “Positive Peace” wording is credited to having been used for the first time by Martin 
Luther King in 1953” but the white moderate, who is more devoted to "order" than to justice; who 
prefers a negative peace which is the absence of tension to a positive peace which is the presence 
of justice”. 
  8 
With the publication of the UNDP2 “Human Development Report 1994: 
New Dimensions of Human Security”, the use of “HS” concept and idea begun 
gaining ground. The General Assembly of the United Nations states as a common 
understanding3: “Human Security calls for people-centred, comprehensive, 
context-specific and prevention-oriented responses that strengthen the protection 
and empowerment of all people and all communities”, as the right of people to 
live in freedom and dignity, entitled to freedom from want and freedom from fear. 
It notices how HS actions do not entail the use of force, not replacing State 
Security, acknowledging the primary role and ownership of national Governments 
in implementing HS obligations with respect to the principles and purposes of the 
UN Charter. It also traces a clear distinction between “Human Security” and 
“Responsibility to Protect”. The HS concept, although not replacing “traditional” 
State Security concerns (which, in ideal terms, should be ancillary to it4), comes 
by acknowledging how the HR system gave a central role to the human beings, 
and states’ effectiveness in tackling trans-national realities and asymmetric 
security (state and HS)  threats5 diminished6. An important consideration 
regarding HS is worth to be quoted verbatim, as in the “Thematic Guidance Note 
for Regional and National Human Development Report Teams”7: “The concept 
does not only apply to fragile states. Security, in the broad sense, is important for 
all societies. The Human Security approach is flexible and can be tailored to 
different Countries”. This implies as a HS approach shall be regarded as a broad 
perspective through which to analyse threats, encompassing different typologies 
of intervention, therefore including also room for the CPC concept. 
                                                 
 
 
2
Human Development Report 1994 , New York Oxford University Press, UNDP  
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/255/hdr_1994_en_complete_nostats.pdf 
3 A/RES/66/290 “Follow-up to paragraph 143 on human security” of the 2005 World Summit 
Outcome, adopted on the 25th of October, 2015, during the sixty-sixth session;  
https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/HSU/Publications%20and%20Products/GA%20Resolutions%20
and%20Debate%20Summaries/GA%20Resolutions.pdf 
4 A.Papisca, Il Diritto della dignità umana. Riflessioni sulla globalizzazione dei diritti umani, 
Venezia, Marsilio, 2010. 
5 UN General Assembly, «In Larger Freedom: towards development, security and human rights 
for all», Report of the Secretary-General, A/59/2005, 21 March 2005 
6 A. Papisca e M. Mascia, Le relazioni internazionali nell’era dell’interdipendenza e dei diritti 
umani, Padova, Cedam, 2012 (4° ed.). 
7 http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/human_security_guidance_note_r-nhdrs.pdf 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTEGRATING ORGANIZATIONS 
 
 
 
1.1. U.N. Integrated Approach 
In the current international system, the United Nations Organization is the 
pivotal element. The Charter of the UN, signed after the end of the Second World 
War, is the final product of the political agreements reached among the wartime 
“United Nations” victorious on the defeated Axis Powers, with the aim of 
establishing a new international order able “to save succeeding generations from 
the scourge of war”.  
In its wording, the charter allows the use of force in two cases, in self-
defense, as per Art. 51; or following the provisions of Chapter VII, giving to the 
UN Security Council powers on “action with respect to threats to the peace, 
breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression”, with non-military (Art.41) and 
military actions (Art.42), to be exerted by Forces placed under the UNSC 
authority (Art.43) and the control of the UN Military Committee (Art.47). Art.53 
also gives room to the UNSC to use “regional arrangements or agencies for 
enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken 
under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of 
the Security Council”. Of course, being the U.N. Charter the result of political 
compromise following a world war, is far from being perfect1, giving to the 5 
powers entrusted with veto power, the possibility to carry “action on behalf of the 
Organization as may be necessary for the purpose of maintaining international 
peace and security”, as per Art. 106. A “transitional security arrangement” still 
                                                 
 
1
As an example, the UN Military Committee has been described by a British naval historian, Dr. 
Eric Grove, as "a sterile monument to the faded hopes of the founders of the UN". 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539026?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents 
  10 
valid.  
Following, or despite, the incompliance with the architecture foreseen in 
UN Charter’s Chapter VII, UN anyway established and conducted numerous UN 
Peace Keeping Operations, being the first one the United Nations Truce 
Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in 1948. The UN PKO model developed 
during the decades, leading to the establishment of the UN Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations, guided by an Under-Secretary General, supervising the 
UN PKOs around the world.  
What above summarized is the most controversial point of the UN system, 
with regard to the shortcomings on collective security. But as the result of 
political compromises, aimed to achieve shared goals, it is worth highlighting. It 
shall moreover be useful to recall what stated by UNSG Boutros Boutros-Ghali2: 
“Power brings special responsibilities, and temptations. The powerful must resist 
the dual but opposite calls of unilateralism and isolationism if the United Nations 
is to succeed”. Anyhow, setting aside the UN system’s limitations, numerous 
intangible results have been achieved through it, paving the way in the last 70 
years to the International Law of Human Rights, ultimately leading to the HS 
paradigm, recognizing how “State Security” agreements without HS measures are 
hardly sustainable. Through its specialized agencies (UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF 
etc.), the UN catalysed and coordinated international efforts to Humanitarian Aid 
development issues. 
Numerous reports and findings showed contrasting data about the 
effectiveness of UN PKOs, especially with regard to the lack of sustainability, 
thus, long-term results, of these interventions. Milestones in this process, have 
been the “Brahimi Report”3 in the year 2000, which shed light on the lack of 
coherence, leadership and support of deployed PKOs, followed in 2005 by Kofi 
                                                 
 
2 A/47/277 - S/24111 17 June 1992 “An Agenda for Peace Preventive diplomacy, peace-making 
and peace-keeping”, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the 
Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992 http://unrol.org/files/A_47_277.pdf 
3 A/55/305–S/2000/809 “Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations 
in all their aspects”, “Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations” 
http://unrol.org/files/brahimi%20report%20peacekeeping.pdf 
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Annan’s “In larger freedom”4, which focussed more on the practical convergence 
of goals between “State Security-led” PKOs and “Human Security-led” 
development interventions, thus merging the “freedom from fear” and “freedom 
from want” ideas into a unique model of intervention, adding moreover the notion 
of the “freedom to live in dignity”. 
Of course, the operational implementation of concepts is always bound to a 
number of constraints; anyway, the development of thoughts among UN system 
gave birth to the Integrated Mission concept. This consists into a planning process 
coordinating the elements of the UN “family” into a single Country-level UN 
system, carrying on complex, multi-dimensional, peacebuilding interventions. 
The challenge of integrating the components of UN interventions is still 
ongoing, as every complex process, nevertheless it is out of question how the 
efforts to enhance the effectiveness of UN PKO interventions5, integrating the 
agencies specialties, took to a level of coordination unbelievable until just a few 
years ago. It involves together into a single approach political, security, 
development, Human Rights and humanitarian actors (fundamental the OCHA’s 
role into managing humanitarian and emergency relief) at Country level, generally 
under the coordination of a UNSG Special Representative. 
Figure 1: The Core Business of Multi-dimensional United Nations Peacekeeping Operations
6
 
 
                                                 
 
4 A/59/2005 “In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all” 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/59/2005 
5 A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/newhorizon.pdf 
6 “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines” 
https://cc.unlb.org/UNSAS%20Documents/KEY%20DOCUMENTS/United%20Nations%20Peac
ekeeping%20Operations%20Principles%20and%20Guidelines.pdf 
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In 2008, a SG decision defined the Integrated Approach as not requiring a 
structural integration, but providing for it whenever needed, defining a strategic 
partnership between UN PKO (“State Security paradigm”) and UN Country Team 
(“Human Security paradigm”), and mutual cooperation and support, in close 
collaboration with other partners. Also, DPKO’s central Planning capabilities are 
mined by a lack of intelligence capabilities, then delegated to the Country Level7. 
The evolution of UN PKOs is summarized into the statement8: “Beyond 
simply monitoring cease-fires, today’s multi-dimensional peacekeeping 
operations are called upon to facilitate the political process through the 
promotion of national dialogue and reconciliation, protect civilians, assist in the 
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants, support the 
organization of elections, protect and promote Human Rights, and assist in 
restoring the rule of Law”. 
The Integrated Approach requires a shared vision of UN’s strategic goals, 
aligned or integrated planning9, agreed responsibilities (division of tasks, aimed to 
avoid overlapping) and mechanisms for monitoring and impact evaluations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The Challenge of Mission Integration
10
 
 
                                                 
 
7 “Alcune riflessioni su struttura e competenze del dipartimento delle operazioni di pace 
dell’ONU - cooperazione internazionale”, Enzo Fanelli in “Informazioni della Difesa 4/2012  
8 See note 6 
9
Planning Toolkit, 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/Planning%20Toolkit_Web%20Version.pdf 
10
 See note 6 
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1.2 NATO Comprehensive Approach 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is an InterGovernmental Political-
Military Alliance, established by the North Atlantic Treaty signed in 1949, as a 
system of collective, mutual Defence, to respond in case of attacks by external 
parties. During the Cold war, its raison d'être was to deter potential threats of 
aggression carried by the Soviet Union and its Allies in the European continent. 
At the time, the Alliance planning was conducted in the “General Defence Plan” 
framework, developing a number of operational plans aimed to defend NATO 
nation’s territories from an identifiable, quantifiable and symmetric threat, thus 
responding to a full State Security paradigm11. 
Engaged in the early ’90 into operations different from the ones foresaw 
during the cold war, NATO found itself entangled into a twofold reality. The first 
part was made of high-intensity air campaigns (similar to the first part of the 
“Gulf War”, conducted by a non-NATO, UN-mandated and US-led coalition), 
into which the Military Alliance had the possibility to prove its efficiency in 
designing and successfully concluding traditional military operations, although 
limited to the air domain, thus into “winning the war” actions. 
When going to the “boots on the ground”, so to the land domain, the 
Alliance discovered the reality of PKOs (which the Gulf War coalition avoided, 
bounded to a “traditional” military victory on the Iraqi forces), appreciating how 
the operation’s success possibilities could be highly enhanced by a positive 
partnership with other actors present in the area, both Governmental and non-
Governmental. The difference in mind-set required by leadership and units was 
then summarized into the “winning the peace” aim, so to keep the situation on the 
ground safe enough (ensure the “SASE”, safe and secure environment” and 
“FOM”, “Freedom Of Movement”), allowing peace agreements’ implementation. 
It is important how, going to International Law, NATO’s intervention in 
Bosnia in 1992 was conducted in compliance with UNSC Resolutions, while this 
did not happen for the air campaign on Kosovo and Serbia in 1999. 
                                                 
 
11
 Istituto Superiore di Stato Maggiore Interforze “Operations Planning Course - Student 
Handbook ” http://www.difesa.it/SMD_/CASD/IM/ISSMI/Documents/Fusione_Coop_OPC.pdf 
  14 
This breach in International Law was nevertheless justified on Humanitarian 
grounds, after the shocking events of Srebrenica and Rwanda in the 90s, which 
gave the rise to the “Responsibility to Protect”12 doctrine, lately adopted by the 
UN. The presence in the “theatre of operations”, of actors external to the 
traditional dynamics of armed conflicts, imposed restrictions not previously 
considered into the application of military force, limiting the effectiveness of 
many assets and requiring the development of new strategies and tactics13. This 
ultimately leading to a revision in the use of force foreseen by military doctrines, 
as the operations were taking place into essentially permissive environments, with 
a military presence aiming to prevent escalations back into open conflict. 
Traditionally, military cooperation with civilian actors had been regarded as 
a merely logistics challenge, or little more. NATO’s involvement beyond 
domestic borders, anyhow, prompted the need for the military to liaise in a 
different way to civilian issues and actors, establishing the Civilian-Military 
Cooperation (CIMIC) doctrine, defined in NATO14 as: "The co-ordination and 
co-operation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil 
actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as 
international, national and non-Governmental organisations and agencies.". 
Different ideas about CIMIC are considered by other organizations (also in 
EU), as within UN the Civilian-Military Coordination (UN CMCoord) concept is 
established, with an emphasis on the military support role to humanitarian relief15:  
“UN-CMCoord is a key component of OCHA’s core function: coordinating 
humanitarian response. In humanitarian operations with a military presence, 
OCHA leads the establishment and management of interaction with military 
                                                 
 
12 “The Responsibility to Protect” Report of the International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty, 2001 http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf  
13
 Stato Maggiore della Difesa – III Reparto – Centro Innovazione della Difesa “PID/O-5 
L’Apprezzamento del Comandante ed il Progetto della Campagna (Campaign Design)” 
http://www.difesa.it/SMD_/CASD/IM/ISSMI/Documents/Apprezzamento_Comandante_Progetto
_Campagna_PID_O_5_VolI.pdf 
14 AJP-9 NATO CIVIL-MILITARY CO-OPERATION (CIMIC) DOCTRINE, Version June 2003 
http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/AJP-9.pdf 
15
 “What is United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination?” 
https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/OOM_CMCoord_11November2013_eng.pdf 
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actors. This relationship will change depending on the type of emergency and the 
roles and responsibilities of the military”.  
Interventions on the ground in the Balkans were structured to achieve the 
goal of maintaining conditions established by the peace agreements, being in that 
“straight” PKOs. After 9/11 and the intervention in Afghanistan (NATO called for 
the first time in history for “Article 5”, providing for mutual Defence) which, after 
an initial engagement on more “militarily traditional” grounds, evolved into the 
“International Security Assistance Force” (ISAF) Mission. NATO forces found 
themselves stuck into a new and more demanding challenge, named as “Counter 
Insurgency” (COIN) or “Stabilization and Reconstruction” (S&R), as almost no 
SASE was achieved. This while US and other forces where at the same time 
deployed to Iraq, after the “Iraqi Freedom” campaign – which has been defined as 
not in conformity to international Law, thus “illegal”, by UNSG Kofi Annan16 –. 
NATO became lately involved in Iraq, in the form of a Military Training Mission. 
This led to a radical change into NATO’s concerns about non-military 
issues, formalizing the “comprehensive approach” to CMOs. NATO’s topic page 
reports how17: “NATO’s new Strategic Concept, adopted at the Lisbon Summit in 
November 2010, underlines that lessons learned from NATO operations show that 
effective crisis management calls for a comprehensive approach involving 
political, civilian and military instruments. Allied leaders agreed to enhance 
NATO’s contribution to a comprehensive approach to crisis management as part 
of the international community’s effort and to improve NATO’s ability to 
contribute to stabilization and reconstruction.” 
Such a statement summarizes the shift into theoretical view of military role 
in CMOs, originated by the analysis of the outcomes produced by the actions the 
Alliance conducted in its operations (and the United States and other Allies in 
non-NATO interventions), so, the near impossibility of achieving the “desired end 
state”, to “win peace”, with solely military means. It is important to notice as 
NATO, due to its inherent nature of political-military Alliance, is therefore 
                                                 
 
16
 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/sep/16/iraq.iraq 
17
 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_51633.htm 
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essentially a provider of “hard power”, in the form of a military force ready to be 
employed into high-intensity conflicts of “traditional” kind, responding to a “State 
Security” paradigm. Its role in CMOs, nevertheless, imposed a deep revision in its 
strategic thought, in order to render it more functional to the new operational 
needs. Moreover, this shall be seen as an acknowledgment of the supporting role 
of the military component towards other elements in CMOs,  
In its “Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive”18, “NATO recognizes 
that that the military alone cannot resolve a crisis or conflict. There is a need for 
more deliberate and inclusive planning and action through established crisis 
management procedures that allow for both military and non-military resources 
and efforts to be marshalled with a greater unity of purpose. Adopting such a 
comprehensive approach to operations begins with inculcating a culture of active 
collaboration and transparency among those involved in crisis management” 
Figure 3: Theoretical International Strategic Operations Design
19 
                                                 
 
18 https://publicintelligence.net/nato-copd/, Supreme Headquarters Allied Power Europe – Belgium 
- Allied Command Operations - Comprehensive  Operations Planning Directive -Copd Interim 
V1.0 17 December 2010, Https://Info.Publicintelligence.Net/Nato-Copd.Pdf 
19
 Ibidem 
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1.3 E.U. Comprehensive Approach 
The European Union is a political-economic Union operating through a set 
of supra-national institutions and interGovernmental-negotiated decisions among 
the member states. Established in its present form with the Lisbon treaty of 2007, 
the EU explicitly acknowledges the centrality of UN and international Law in the 
collective security system. European identity20 in international relations grew in a 
frame of norms-based multilateralism, promoting Human Rights, International 
Law and institutions. 
EU’s external action took to the development of a broad range of initiatives 
and instruments, considering conflict prevention, civilian and military crisis 
management and peace-building, contributing to the promotion of the Union as an 
actor capable of carrying a wide range of actions in supporting local institutions 
into a development path, within a HS paradigm. 
EU is considered to be an actor wielding considerable “soft power”21  into 
the international arena; this labels the capability to influence other’s decisions and 
the events by mean of non-coercive measures. In tackling the challenges of 
contemporary reality, the EU acknowledges the impossibility, for a single nation 
or organization, to exert sufficient power and enact the full range of actions 
required to positively influence the course of the events22: “Many of the most 
critical security threats the world faces today […] are interconnected and 
increasingly complex, impacting on both developing and industrialised Countries  
alike. […]. Impressive technological and scientific advances […] offer significant 
opportunities for growth, development and improvement of human wellbeing, yet 
they may also carry with them security threats that need to be better understood 
and mitigated. In a multi-polar world, responding to these challenges in an 
                                                 
 
20 J. Howorth, Implementing a ‘grand strategy’, in A. de Vasconcelos, What ambitions for 
European defence in 2020?, Paris, Institute for Security Studies/European Union, 2009 
21 J.S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, New York, Public Affairs Press, 
2005 
22 Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) - Thematic Strategy Paper 2014-2020 
Multi-annual Indicative Programme 2014-2017 
http://www.eeas.europa.eu/ifs/docs/icsp_strategy_paper_2014-2020_and_mip_2014-
2017_annex_en.pdf 
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effective manner requires a significant collective effort, based on strong 
partnerships with other states, civil society actors, multilateral and regional 
partners. Threats to international peace and security cannot be efficiently tackled 
by States acting individually. Synergies and cooperation are also increasingly 
needed at international level, as donors are facing similar problems in terms of 
scarce resources. In the face of increasingly complex challenges, none of the EU's 
internal objectives […] will be achieved in isolation from the wider world”. 
In order to efficiently confront these threats and contribute to a wider 
understanding and, consequently, improvement of crisis or potential crisis 
situations, the EU elaborated during the last decade its own concept of 
“Comprehensive Approach” to external conflict and crises. The most up to date 
formalization of this concept shall be found into a Joint Communication23, 
followed by a document reporting the Council’s conclusions24, defining the steps 
taken and foreseen towards its implementation: 
1- Development of a shared analysis, noticing how a coherent strategy for 
conflict prevention and CMOs starts with shared data and analysis; 
2- Definition of a common strategic vision, through joint policy definition; 
3- Focus on prevention, before violence erupts; 
4- Mobilisation of different strengths and capacities of the EU, including 
Civil Society and NGOs; 
5- Long term commitment, to peace and state building, also in education; 
6- Linkage of policies and internal and external action; 
7- Better use of EU Delegations, as focal points into third Countries ; 
8- Work in partnership, with, UN, NATO, IMF, WB etc. 
The improvements in theoretical concepts and the experiences from the 
engagements that the EU already undertook or are currently ongoing, took the EU 
to what shall be regarded as the most HS “inspired” concept of intervention, 
                                                 
 
23 JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL - 
The EU's comprehensive approach to external conflicts and crises - Brussels, 11.12.2013 
http://www.eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2013/131211_03_en.pdf 
24 Council conclusions on the EU's comprehensive approach FOREIG_ AFFAIRS Council meeting 
Brussels, 12 May 2014 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/142552.pdf 
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encompassing a very broad spectrum of possible actions, including, for instance, 
educational sides of peace and nation building, often not considered. It has been 
remarked25, for instance, as the lack of a proper intervention into Bosnian 
educational system allowed the perpetuation of an ethnical bias, which negatively 
influenced youth respect to peaceful cohabitation.  
As previously mentioned, the EU is a main actor in the field of soft power 
but, as widely known, is still developing credible hard power capabilities. When, 
with the interventions in the Balkans, the need to deploy consistent EU-led 
military assets emerged, the EU sought for a deeper cooperation with NATO, 
which took to the “Berlin plus”26 agreements, defining the ways the latter was 
going to support the former, in terms of information, planning and assets. 
 Despite that, efforts in developing a better integration also under a military 
and police perspective have been made, pursuing an improved CFSP and CSDP 
policy coherence and EEAS empowerment, although the transformation process is 
constantly ongoing. This due to the rising increase in demand for the EU to 
provide more security, alongside its soft power capabilities, because as HR/VP 
Mogherini27 said, “There can be no development without security, as there can be 
no security without development”. It seems then relevant to underline the 
developments of this line of thought, by taking into account the Council of the EU 
Conclusions on CSDP28 and on HR and democracy.  
The first document underlines the need to further strengthen the links 
between external and internal security, encouraging “the development of further 
synergies between CSDP, in its civilian and military dimensions, and Freedom, 
                                                 
 
25
 Gen.C.A. CC Vincenzo Coppola reported speech into “Difesa: cooperazione fra diplomazia, 
forze di pace e università, nuova strategia per missioni peacekeeping e prevenzione conflitti”, “Il 
nuovo giornale dei militari”, 16 Aug 2015, http://www.nuovogiornaledeimilitari.com/difesa-
cooperazione-fra-diplomazia-forze-di-pace-e-universita-nuova-strategia-missioni-peacekeeping 
26  EU-NATO: THE FRAMEWORK FOR PERMANENT RELATIONS AND BERLIN PLUS 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/03-11-
11%20Berlin%20Plus%20press%20note%20BL.pdf 
27 EUROPEAN UNION MILITARY COMMITTEE Chairman’s E - Newsletter Issue n. 19, 
September 2015 Interview Mrs Federica Mogherini http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/structures-
instruments-agencies/eumc/documents/issuespecialedition_en.pdf 
28
 Council conclusions on CSDP, 18 May 2015 -  http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-
releases/2015/05/18-council-conclusions-csdp/ 
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Security and Justice Actors”, “including Europol, FRONTEX and CEPOL, Interpol, 
and the European Gendarmerie Force”. It also recognizes the need to increase the 
efficiency of CM, planning and conduct of CSDP operations; it draws guidelines 
on how to increase effectiveness, visibility and impact of CSDP and to enhance 
the development of capabilities. It also stresses the need to strengthen the 
European Defence technological and industrial base. The second Conclusion29 
highlights the EU policy regarding the “Action Plan on HR and Democracy”, 
aimed to boost the ownership of local actors (including third Countries ’ CSO and 
supporting HRD), to address HR challenges and ensure a comprehensive HR 
approach to conflicts (including the mainstreaming of HR into all phases of CSDP 
planning, review and conduct, “with emphasis on the protection of civilians in 
particular children, and the empowerment and participation of women and 
girls”); finally, to foster coherence and consistency among EU HR and CSDP 
instruments. 
 With reference to the inclusion of Civil Society (CS) and Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGO) into peace processes, it seems important to 
highlight the establishment in 2014 of the “Instrument contributing to Stability 
and Peace”30 (IcSP) and the “Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights 
worldwide” (EIDHR). The first one is intended to contribute to peace and stability 
by sustaining EU external action, through technical and financial assistance to a 
range of initiatives aimed to good governance and conflict prevention. The second 
one is more focused in promoting democratization and Human Rights policies. 
In its efforts to “bring together our development support and our security 
assistance in Countries plagued by conflict”31, the EU pushed towards a better 
coordination, so that Humanitarian Aid became a natural part of this struggle. In 
2007 common understandings brought to the “European consensus on 
                                                 
 
29  Council Conclusions on the Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2015 – 2019  20 
July 2015; http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10897-2015-INIT/en/pdf 
30
 the Regulation establishing an Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/fpi/what-we-do/instrument_contributing_to_stability_and_peace_en.htm 
31 See note 27 
  21 
Humanitarian Aid”32, issued by the European Commission; a wide reformation 
process enhanced the proficiency of the EU Humanitarian Aid and Civil 
Protection Department (ECHO), leading to a better planning and coordination of 
humanitarian interventions33; also, a European Voluntary Humanitarian Aid Corps 
has been established and is planned to become operational in 201634. 
In the light of the measures taken, it seems the EU policies definition has 
been following the recommendations of the “Barcelona Report”35, calling for 
primacy of Human Rights, clear political authority, multilateralism, bottom-up 
approach, regional focus, use of legal instruments and appropriate use of force. It 
could be also deemed how EU is seeking to a major improvement in its’ actions 
coherence, as outlined by Pirozzi’s36 considerations on EU CM. This, in order to 
achieve long-standing and sustainable peace and stability within a HS frame. 
 
Figure 4: The conflict transformation timeline
37 
                                                 
 
32 THE EUROPEAN CONSENSUS ON HUMANITARIAN AID - The humanitarian challenge 
http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/media/publications/consensus_en.pdf 
33 General Guidelines for Operational Priorities on Humanitarian Aid in 2015 
http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/strategy/strategy_2015_en.pdf 
34 EU REG No 375/2014 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 3 
April 2014 (‘EU Aid Volunteers initiative’) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32014R0375&from=EN 
35 A Human Security Doctrine for Europe. The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe’s 
Security Capabilities, Presented to EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security 
Policy Javier Solana, Barcelona, 15 September 2004 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/research/CSHS/humanSecurity/barcelonaReport.pdf 
36 Pirozzi, The EU ́s Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Management, EU Crisis Management 
Paper Series, Brussels, DCAF, 2013; http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/The-EU-s-Comprehensive-
Approach-to-Crisis-Management 
37 Guidance note on the use of Conflict Analysis in support of EU external action 
http://www.pacedifesa.org/public/documents/EEAS%20guidance%20note%20on%20conflict%20
analysis.pdf 
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1.4 European Countries  Integrated Approaches 
The ambition of achieving a better comprehensiveness into crisis 
management and external action has been pursued also at National level, with the 
clear intention of obtaining a maximization of the outputs, while at the same time 
(due to the crisis situation) sparing resources, both human and economical. Within 
Europe, as mentioned in the previous paragraph, a major issue in defining a 
collective action is to gather awareness into issues tackling common interests and, 
as a consequence, to draft, approve and follow shared courses of action. This due 
to the fact that, in many cases, national policies are constrained by local issues 
catalysing in a more direct and immediate way the public opinion interests and 
feelings. Moreover, among a State and the other, there are several differences in 
national interests and into the way “whole of Government approaches” are 
conceived and realized.  
It is important to keep in mind how, due to the very simple fact that States 
are, by definition, the actors of “State Security” system, diplomatic and military 
apparatus are usually the leading components of “whole of Government” 
approaches. As a result, national “strategic cultures”, so the willingness – or the 
lack of it – to get involved into external action, especially with a military 
dimension, deeply influences the various solutions. Despite that, possibly showing 
the mainstreaming of the HS paradigm into national strategic cultures, several 
states have included, or are including, NGO and CSO into their architectures. 
A Report38, “Gaps between Comprehensive Approaches of the EU and EU 
member states”, published in December 2014 by the “Knowledge Platform 
Security & Rule of Law (KPSRL)” gives an hindsight on the agreements which led 
to current EU CA: “It serves the UK that prefers NATO as a construct for more 
robust and offensive military missions; it serves Denmark, which has an optout of 
the CSDP; it serves Sweden, which aligns itself with CSDP missions only if they 
are covered by a UN mandate; and it serves Germany, which has no strong 
                                                 
 
38 “Gaps between Comprehensive Approaches of the EU and EU member states” Volker Hauck 
and Camilla Rocca, December 2014, European Centre for Development Policy Management  
http://ecdpm.org/wp-content/uploads/Gaps-Between-Comprehensieve-Approach-of-the-EU-and-
EU-Member-States.pdf 
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ambition to act militarily at the EU level. Furthermore, it serves France, as it 
leaves the door open for more CSDP missions (and French control over them) as 
long as they are discussed among EU member states in the relevant Council 
bodies, including the Political and Security Committee (PSC)”. The report defines 
the dimensions of CA to CM external action and goes for a comparison among 6 
European Countries, useful in the brief analysis of the Italian situation, chapter 2: 
1- Political and strategic purpose, so why and for what a CA; 
2- Scope: a narrow approach limiting to CIMIC/CMCoord, a medium one, 
including diplomacy, security (military and police) and development, or a 
system-wide one, adding also ROL, business and trade; 
3- Degree of interaction and use of instruments: from information sharing, to 
coordination of activities to joint planning and implementation; 
4- Level of institutional formalisation: from “ad-hoc cooperation” to “flexible 
arrangements” to agreed and pre-established institutional networks; 
5- National or international orientation: the level of proactivity towards 
cooperation with other non-national and international actors. 
UK’s CA has been found to be a system-wide one, with a high institutional 
integration level, where the “National Security Council” orients the actions of 
MoFA, MoD and DFID (Department for International Development), which are 
linked to the national security strategy. There is a shared funding mechanism in 
place, jointly managed. UK supports EU conflict prevention in CSDP military 
missions, although strongly advocates CMO of military kind under NATO 
umbrella. 
Germany’s “Vernetzte Sichereit”, “Networked Security”, is a system-wide 
concept of CA, with a low level of institutional integration and a plurality of 
coordination mechanisms, without shared funding systems. Germany supports EU 
external actions, usually refraining from military interventions. 
French “Approche Globale”, “Global Approach”, has a limited scope, 
focused on civil-military cooperation, with a high institutional integration, where 
the MoFA provides for inter-ministerial coordination with MoD and ad-hoc 
involvement of development agency. There is no shared funding system, though 
the Ministry of Finance is involved in inter-ministerial meetings. France supports 
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European integration also on the military side, with scant interest towards conflict 
prevention. 
Sweden’s CA is system-wide with high institutional integration among 
diplomacy, foreign trade and development; MoD and other ministries engaged ad-
hoc. Strongly supports EU conflict prevention, in a HS perspective, participating 
in EU or NATO (although not being a NATO member, Sweden is member of the 
“Partnership for Peace” program since 1995) CMO under UN mandate. 
Danish “whole-of-Government” or integrated approach is system-wide and 
highly integrated, with MoFA leading the approach in close coordination with the 
MoD; the Danish Development Agency is part of the MoFA, with NGOs and 
private sector included in such framework. Funding is shared with decisions taken 
by an inter-ministerial committee. Denmark has an opt-out option from CSDP 
(unique case) and participates to NATO and UN operations. 
The Netherlands “Integrated Approach” is a system-wide one, with a high 
integration led by MoFA and MoD extended to Police and Development, 
coordinating on a case basis with NGOs and private sector and a shared funding. 
The Country supports European integration, also in the military field, supporting 
EU CA and participating to CMO.  
Of course, also US and Canada have their “whole-of-Government 
approach”. The Russian Federation, in Ukraine, showed a worrying masterful 
attitude in applying a CA to offensive goals39: “War and peace, Mr Gerasimov 
wrote, in remarks that now seem prophetic, are becoming more blurred. 
“Methods of conflict,” he wrote, have changed, and now involve “the broad use 
of political, economic, informational, humanitarian and other non-military 
measures”.  NATO categorised this approach “hybrid warfare”40 
                                                 
 
39 August 28, 2014, Ukraine: Russia’s new art of war, by Sam Jones for Financial Times 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/ea5e82fa-2e0c-11e4-b760-00144feabdc0.html#ixzz3gkf2m87i 
40
 NATO’s Hybrid Flanks- NATO Defense College, Jacobs & Lasconjarias 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/documents/sede/dv/sede011015resarchpaper
nato_/sede011015resarchpapernato_en.pdf Rome, 2015 
  25 
1.5 Integration Issues 
The acknowledgment of the difficulties in performing actions with 
efficiency and effectiveness in CMO took to the development of the CA, 
interpreted in different ways, of course. As usual, anyway, the theoretical concept 
clashes with its practical implementation due to a large number of reasons. 
At the international as well as national and local levels, different actors have 
different policies, which somehow hamper CA operationalisation. The 
involvement of local actors (important to remember, partnering local 
organisations is a pivotal element of the sustainability of peace and security 
interventions) is sometimes difficult, especially where security concerns are 
important. Military actions by the US and its Allies, during the recent campaigns, 
failed too often in factoring in the right way the effects of their actions on local 
population, taking to an important shift into military doctrine, more driven by 
global constraints and less by tactical considerations. This nevertheless 
deteriorated in some manner the willingness of humanitarian actors and NGOs in 
being involved into interventions alongside the military. Of course, the 
Humanitarian Principles, being Humanity, Impartiality, Neutrality and 
Independence (and more recently, the “do not harm” principle), cannot be easily 
operationalized within a strictly politically-driven action and this causes tensions 
and attritions. As mentioned, another major problem in coordinating International 
Organisations efforts is given by the difficulties in gathering sufficient consensus 
among member states around an issue and on the instruments to enact in order to 
engage it.  
An interesting case study regarding inter-organizational issues is “Police 
knowledge sharing capabilities”41 and some of its conclusions can be considered. 
With regard to “barriers to knowledge sharing”, difficulties noticed have been the 
                                                 
 
41 Lead Authors: Kamal Birdi, Kerry Allen, Christine Turgoose, Ian Macdonald & Julia Vössing: 
Institute of Work Psychology, Management School, University of Sheffield, UK, COMPOSITE 
Knowledge sharing research programme. http://www.composite-
project.eu/tl_files/fM_k0005/download/COMPOSITE%20WP3%20Brochure.pdf 
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“bureaucratic processes for sharing” and “forces being insular”, due to 
incompatible information structures and procedures. Among findings and 
recommendations, the study concluded how some actions shall be taken: 
“awareness of organisational and legislative differences should be improved”, 
“effective leadership and leading by example”, “clear and efficient processes for 
quick knowledge sharing”, “strategies should be developed in conjunction with 
other forces”, “better relationship should be developed through regular face-to-
face activities” and “standardised technological system should be utilised”. 
Although the study examined Police forces only, these findings are relevant 
for any knowledge sharing and policy developing processes among different 
organisations, especially when engaging in CA with a common, shared final end. 
An ECHO Summary note42, dealing with coordination of Humanitarians and 
Police for the Protection of Civilians, notes how the need for mutual cooperation 
has been acknowledge by all actors. It has often been hampered, anyway, by the 
lack of awareness of the respective mandates, policies and principles, at local, 
operational and strategic levels. Moreover, the opportunity for a more stable 
coordination among components has been noticed. Lessons learned from the most 
positive experiences in this sense (Georgia and Darfur) should be captured and 
developed. The need for a better coherence, driven by a top-down approach, has 
also been noticed43, as efforts are often wasted into fragmentary and confusing 
actions, although the final aim should be the same. Furthermore, another major 
problem is the short-time vision of many interventions, suitable in some cases for 
military actions, but for sure negative for nation building purposes (see figure 4). 
In conclusion, coherence of efforts should to be pursued by organisations 
aware and respectful of each one’s mandate, on a common shared information 
base, towards complementary goals aiming to achieve the same agreed end state. 
Defining how to best attain such a complex capability is an ongoing process. 
                                                 
 
42 Roundtable on Civil–Military Coordination The Police, Humanitarians and the Protection of 
Civilians: Coordinating ‘Civilian’ Contributions 1 March 2012 ECHO Headquarters, Rue d’Arlon, 
88, 1049 Brussels, Belgium  https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/01-03-
12%20Roundtable%20Summary%20-
%20The%20police%20humanitarians%20and%20protection%20of%20civilians.pdf 
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 See note 25 
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CHAPTER 2 
ITALIAN NATIONAL MULTI-DIMENSIONAL APPROACH 
 
 
 
2.1 National Crisis Management Organization and Intelligence role 
The Italian Republic undertook, during the last decade, an extensive reform 
process in many fields, including its Intelligence, Crisis Management, 
Humanitarian Aid, Foreign Affairs and Defence structures. The situation is 
developing, as many relevant implementing provisions have not been issued up to 
October 2015.  
 
2.1.1. The Intelligence organisation 
Law 124/200744 gave a renewed the Republic’s information and security 
system and the policy on secret matters, to enhance national intelligence 
capabilities, political direction and democratic control. The Head of the National 
Information and Security System is the Prime Minister, who shall delegate some 
of his or her functions to a Delegated Authority (DA), overseeing the Department 
of Information for Security (DIS), which coordinates the Agencies for Internal 
and External Information and Security (AISE and AISI). The Law also established 
the “Comitato Interministeriale per la Sicurezza della Repubblica” 
(“Interministerial Committee for the Security of the Republic”, CISR), whose 
members are the PM, the DA and the heads of MoFA, MoI, MoD, MoJ, MEF, 
MED (Economic Development), to give guidance on information and security 
policy. 
The Law also transformed the previous “Comitato Parlamentare di 
                                                 
 
44 Legge 3 agosto 2007, n. 124 "Sistema di informazione per la sicurezza della Repubblica e nuova 
disciplina del segreto " pubblicata nella Gazzetta Ufficiale n. 187 del 13 agosto 2007 
http://www.camera.it/parlam/leggi/07124l.htm 
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Controllo sui Servizi Segreti”, “Parliamentary Control Committee on the Secret 
Services” (“COPACO”) into the new and more incisive45 “Comitato 
Parlamentare per la Sicurezza della Repubblica”, “Parliamentary Committee for 
the Security of the Republic” (COPASIR), which has the important role of 
supervising that the Republic’s Information And Security System operates 
following Laws and rules46. Its president is chosen among parliamentary 
opposition’s parties. It has been entrusted, by Law 133/201247, with wider 
attributions about delving into alleged irregularities by personnel of the 
information and security services. 
 
2.1.2. The Crisis Management structure 
The Italian CM structure is defined by the “DPCM 05/05/2010, 
Organizzazione Nazionale per la gestione di crisi”48, “National Crisis 
Management Organisation”. Its adoption was needed in order to update national 
procedures and make it interoperable to a certain extent with EU and NATO’s 
ones, with particular attention paid to accurate intelligence handling. 
The NCMO determines, when deemed necessary, the contrast measures of 
crisis situations handled by UN, NATO, EU and other IO, taking the burden of all 
crisis which cannot be handled by other already existing structures. 
The Decree institutes the “Comitato Politico Strategico” “Political-
                                                 
 
45 SISTEMA DI INFORMAZIONE PER LA SICUREZZA DELLA REPUBBLICA - LE 
INFORMAZIONI PER LA SICUREZZA IN UN SISTEMA DEMOCRATICO Idee per avviare 
un dibattito e affrontare una sfida culturale – Quaderno di Intelligence 1 – Gnosis 
http://www.sicurezzanazionale.gov.it/sisr.nsf/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Q1-Quaderno-di-
intelligence-1.pdf 
46 COMITATO PARLAMENTARE PER LA SICUREZZA DELLA REPUBBLICA 
RELAZIONE ANNUALE (Attivita` svolta dal 6 giugno 2013 al 30 settembre 2014) 
http://www.senato.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/BGT/845634.pdf 
47
 Legge 7 agosto 2012, n. 133 Modifiche alla legge 3 agosto 2007, n. 124, concernente il Sistema 
di informazione per la sicurezza della Repubblica e la disciplina del segreto 
http://www.parlamento.it/application/xmanager/projects/parlamento/file/repository/commissioni/bi
camerali/COMITATO%20SICUREZZA/Legge_7_agosto_2012.pdf 
48 DECRETO DEL PRESIDENTE DEL CONSIGLIO DEI MINISTRI 5 maggio 2010 
Organizzazione nazionale per la gestione di crisi. 
http://www.sarannoprefetti.it/SP/index.php?option=com_content&view =article&id=789:dpcm-5-
maggio-2010-organizzazione-nazionale-per-la-gestione-di-crisi&catid=144:difesa-
civile&Itemid=26 
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Strategic Committee”, (CoPS), to “give address and national strategic guidance 
into crisis situations”. CoPS is led by the Prime Minister and includes the 
Ministers of MoFA, MoI, MoD and MEF (assisted in the meetings by relevant 
personnel), complemented by, among the others, the heads of public security, 
information and security services and the CDS, plus others as needed. The CoPS 
evaluates the situation, examines and defines the provisions to be submitted to the 
Council of Ministries for approval and, in case of need, authorizes on a temporary 
basis the undertaking of contrast measures. In circumstances of exceptional and 
urgent needs, the PM takes the measures deemed necessary, informing the other 
CoPS components. All CoPS decisions are forwarded to the President of the 
Republic (in Italy, he is the “Supreme Commander” of the Armed Forces and 
chairs the “Supreme Defence Council”, foreseen by Constitution’s Article 87). 
The Decree then establishes the “Nucleo Interministeriale Situazione e 
Pianificazione”, “Interministerial Situation and Planning Group” (NISP), to 
support CoSP and the PM. NISP President is the Undersecretary of State to PM, 
who shall delegate these functions to PM’s Military Counsellor. NISP includes 
two representatives of MoFA, MOI and MoD, one of MEF and others from the 
information and security services and other state structures. The NISP gathers at 
least every two months and its components are constantly linked with IT means. 
Its functions are, basically, to coordinate every structure’s actions for crisis 
prevention and response, gathering and handling relevant intelligence, promoting 
interministerial planning; coordinates national tasks within international CM 
agreements. During actual crisis situations, it monitors the situation, elaborates the 
“national stance” towards it and drafts proposals to the CoPS. 
As the NCMO is based on a Decree instead than a Law, it has been argued 
as this may cause coordination difficulties with other structures already in place49, 
when not even an inter-institutional conflict leading to confusion50 . What has 
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 Difesa civile La riforma dell’organizzazione nazionale per la ‘‘gestione di crisi’’DECRETO 
DEL PRESIDENTE DEL CONSIGLIO DEI MINISTRI 5 MAGGIO 2010, Matteo Gnes in 
Giornale di diritto amministrativo 1/2011 
http://www.irpa.eu/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/gda2011_01_Gnes_GestioneCrisi.pdf 
50
 L’affermazione Del Comitato Interministeriale Per La Sicurezza Della Repubblica (Cisr)Quale 
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been confirmed, anyway, is the fundamental role of Intelligence Services in 
supporting the ministerial and Governmental decision making process51, as well in 
reaching positive outcomes in crisis management52, a role which is sought to be 
further developed also in regard to cybernetic security53 (DPCM 24/01/2013), 
looking for synergies with civil society, and entrusting the NISP with 
responsibilities on the monitoring of “cybernetic crises”.  
 
2.1.3. The evolution of the National Multi-Dimesional Approach 
With reference to the external action, the MoFA and MoD partnership is a 
long-standing one, which released in 2012 the “Approccio Nazionale Multi-
Dimensionale alla gestione delle crisi”, “National Multi-Dimensional Approach 
to crisis management”54 (ANMD). The document elaborates the guidelines for the 
configuration of national CMO, on both a national or multinational scale, as a 
product of the whole “Sistema Paese”, “National System”. It was forwarded to the 
NISP in 2011. In addressing the Italian Senior Military Leadership55, the pro-
tempore CDS General Biagio Abrate made explicit reference to the HS concept, 
stressing how the military component of a CMO is just a contribution to S&R 
efforts and, for other elements, coherence of efforts with the military will be a 
requisite for ultimate success. MoD established in 1997, for the purpose of 
                                                                                                                                     
 
Nuovo Protagonista Della Politica Di Sicurezza Nazionale Riccardo Bellandi, 2013, in 
http://www.federalismi.it/ApplOpenFilePDF.cfm?artid=23697&dpath=document&dfile=0312201
3161508.pdf&content=L’affermazione+del+Comitato+interministeriale+per+la+sicurezza+della+
Repubblica+(Cisr)+quale+nuovo+protagonista+della+politica+di+sicurezza+nazionale+-+stato+-
+dottrina+-+ 
51 See note 45 
52 Informativa urgente del Governo sulla liberazione delle due volontarie italiane rapite in Siria nel 
luglio 2014 Intervento del Ministro degli affari esteri e della cooperazione internazionale 
http://www.camera.it/leg17/410?idSeduta=0364&tipo=stenografico#sed0364.stenografico.tit0003
0.sub00010 
53
 Direttiva recante indirizzi per la protezione cibernetica e la sicurezza informatica nazionale 
http://www.sicurezzanazionale.gov.it/sisr.nsf/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/dpcm-24-01-2013.pdf  
54 Approccio Nazionale Multi-Dimensionale alla gestione delle crisi (ANMD) Ed. 2012 
http://www.difesa.it/SMD_/Staff/Reparti/III/CID/Dottrina/Pagine/Approccio_Nazionale_Multi_Di
mensionale.aspx 
55 Intervento del Capo di Stato Maggiore della Difesa, Gen. Biagio Abrate, presso il Centro 
Simulazione e Validazione dell’Esercito (Ce.Si.Va.) Civitavecchia - 28 giugno 2012 in 
Informazioni della Difesa 4/2012 
http://www.difesa.it/InformazioniDellaDifesa/periodico/periodico_2012/Documents/R4_2012/R4_
2012.pdf 
  31 
tracking the situations ongoing into operational theatres abroad and providing the 
needed Command and Control, the “Sala Operativa del Comando Operativo 
Interforze”, “Operations Room of the Joint Operations Headquarters” (JOC-COI). 
The organization of MoFA for what concerns the “traditional” diplomatic 
organization did not change consistently with the new Law, dealt with in 2.2, so it 
is sufficient to underline the role of the “Unità di Crisi”, “Crisis Unit” (MAECI-
UDC) in handling crisis situations involving Italian nationals abroad. 
With regard to that, it is interesting to point-out how the Italian Embassies 
are tasked to draft “emergency” and “evacuation” plans, to be enacted in cases of 
need, in order to safeguard nationals’ safety. About risk analysis, planning is 
fundamental and access to information is a prerequisite to this activity, conducted 
mainly in the local Diplomatic Representations, with the cooperation of the UDC. 
In emergency cases, the Head of Mission shall request to MAECI a “Non-
combatant Evacuation Operation”, initiating after a Governmental authorisation, 
ordered by the CDS and placed under the Chief of Diplomatic Mission’s 
responsibility. The technical aspects are charged to the Chief of Military 
Contingent, supported by the COI-JOC, which shall request to employ a Special 
Operations Forces Contingent. A CASD Workgroup elaborated in 201356, saw in 
the lack of proper information on nationals abroad and conditions on the ground 
as the main issues with regard to this kind of operations, criticising the “all-Italian 
tendency to a private, independent and subsidiary management of the presence 
abroad”. The Study deemed as necessary to “incentive the information exchange 
among nationals abroad, NGO and Diplomatic Representations”. 
In the years 2013 and 2014, several Law Proposals57 have been advanced in 
the Parliament, aiming to give to the Country a unique, general discipline with 
regard to international missions, still laking, as the situations are handled on a six-
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 Predisposizioni strategiche per l’evacuazione e/o la protezione dell’incolumità dei connazionali 
non combattenti in caso di crisi” (Non-combatant Evacuation Operations – NEO 
http://www.difesa.it/SMD_/CASD/IM/CeMiSS/Pubblicazioni/ricerche/Documents/Ricerche_2014
/Ricerca_AH_S_08.pdf 
57
 Disposizioni in materia di missioni internazionali A.C. 45, A.C. 933, A.C. 952 e A.C. 1959 
http://documenti.camera.it/Leg17/Dossier/Pdf/DI0126.Pdf 
  32 
month basis, losing so in terms of interventions’ coherence. The Draft Law, 
“Disposizioni concernenti la partecipazione dell'Italia alle missioni 
internazionali”, “Provisions regarding the Italian participation to international 
missions”, has been lately approved by the Chamber of the Deputies and 
forwarded to the Senate in May 2015 and, after evaluations by the Defence 
Commission, is currently before the Senate’s Assembly (since September 15th, 
2015)58. Among the proponents, Member of the Chamber Giulio Marcon (see 
chapter 4.1). 
 In general terms, the Draft aims to define the possible employment of 
Italian Military, Police, Civilian and Humanitarian assets, within the contours of 
General International Law, International Human Rights Law, International 
Humanitarian Law and International Criminal Law, mainstreaming relevant 
international provisions (like UNSC Res. 1325). Important to observe how the 
Draft Law approved by the Chamber of the Deputies explicitly includes the 
“Corpi Civili di Pace”, CPC, as an Italian asset. The Draft foresees Italian 
interventions in CMO as authorised by the Parliament and the Government on a 
yearly base – or under particular circumstances –, weighing a MAECI proposal 
coordinated with MoD, reporting to the Parliament on the state of the mission. 
The report is integrated by the evaluation of relevant IO on the Italian contingent 
and the Government gives also account on the results of the Development 
Cooperation’s activities. It then deals with financial and personnel provisions and, 
on Penal Law matter, establishes as standard to apply the Military Peacetime 
Code, unless different decisions are taken by the Government. It is pointed out the 
legitimacy of the use of weapons, force and other coercive means, when respectful 
of the Rules of Engagement and underlined the obligations deriving from the 
ratification of the Statute of the International Criminal Court. Furthermore, the 
Draft foresees a “Diplomatic and Cooperation Advisor”, attached to the National 
Military Contingent Commander, if deemed useful for specific cases. This shall 
be seen as an Italianisation of the “Civil Affairs” concept, like in UNIFIL.  
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 Fascicolo Iter DDL S. 1917 Disposizioni concernenti la partecipazione dell'Italia alle missioni 
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2.2 Reform of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation 
Due to several reasons59, not last a persistent political instability and a faulty 
attitude in gaining international credibility, Italy experienced strong difficulties in 
developing a strategic vision of the Country’s international stance and action. 
Law 125/201460 gives a new set to the “Cooperazione internazionale per lo 
sviluppo”, renovating the system previously ruled by a Law passed in 1987. The 
first, important point to underline, is the new name of the Italian MoFA, from 
“Ministero degli Affari Esteri”, MAE, to “Ministero degli Affari Esteri e della 
Cooperazione Internazionale”, MAECI, as the Law acknowledges the 
Cooperation role as “an important and qualifying part of Italian Foreign 
Politics”, inspired by UN Charter and European Charter of HR, in compliance 
with the Art.11 of the Italian Constitution, “repudiation of war”. It also recognizes 
the centrality of the human being, in both its individual and communitarian 
dimensions, explicitly referring to HS concept, reaffirming the role of 
internationally agreed Humanitarian Principles and the support to local actors. It 
also envisions a role of the immigrants communities in promoting local 
development in the Countries of origin, (such as small businesses)61 and in the 
definition of better migration policies. It states how cooperation funding can’t be 
used, either directly or indirectly, to support military operations. The Reform 
“raises the level” about the role of International Cooperation within Italian 
Foreign Politics. The political responsibility of Development Cooperation is given 
to the Minister of MAECI, who delegates functions to a Deputy-Minister with 
respect to Development Cooperation matters. The Minister proposes, together 
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with the Minister of MEF to The Ministers’ Council the “Triennial Cooperation 
Planning Document”, for approval. Parliamentary Commissions for Foreign 
Affairs shall forward proposals about drafting the Planning Document and receive 
implementations reports. The Law institutes a “Comitato Interministeriale per la 
Cooperazione allo Sviluppo”, “Interministerial Committee for Development 
Cooperation”, CICS. This Committee has to ensure the coherence of cooperation 
activities with Governmental choices, the proper information of national policies 
with cooperation aims and it is composed of 11 Ministers and other subjects. The 
“Direzione Generale per la Cooperazione allo Sviluppo”, “Directorate General 
for Development Cooperation” is entrusted with the elaboration of cooperation 
interventions’ guidelines, in adherence to the lines of National Foreign Politics62. 
It shall handle the political dialogue with the Governments of partner Countries in 
defining development priorities63. In implementing Cooperation projects, the 
“Agenzia Italiana per la Cooperazione allo Sviluppo”, “Italian Agency for 
Development Cooperation” (AICS) has been established and its Statute recently 
approved64, with a focus on sustainable development. More over, Law establishes 
the “Consiglio Nazionale per la Cooperazione allo Sviluppo”, “National Council 
for Development Cooperation”, CNCS. Its members are drawn out of a wide part 
of national society, including local institutions, ONG, CSO and Universities65. 
 
2.2.1. MAECI’s way ahead 
Extremely remarkable efforts have been made by the MAECI in pursuing 
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transparency66, also in Cooperation, enhancing a project managing complying 
with European standards, previously not thoroughly taken into account6768. 
With these new provisions, the subjects of Italian Cooperation increased, 
involving a much wider portion on national society, aiming to strongly push 
towards economic development of partner Countries. It involves now the State 
Administration, universities and public entities, local institutions, CSO, non-profit 
and, the most remarkable novelty, profit subjects. The last ones should be 
“adhering to the commonly agreed standards on social responsibility and 
environmental clauses, moreover respecting relevant Human Rights norms on 
international investment”. The AICS promotes innovative partnership forms, 
involving small and medium enterprises, in sustaining the growth of private sector 
in partner Countries. The DGCS prompted a form of cooperation with the MoE 
(in Italy MIUR, “Ministero dell’Istruzione, dell’Università e della Ricerca”), 
aiming to spread knowledge about Development Cooperation within the national 
education system69, with a local focus, although still on a limited scale70.  
 The first cooperation’s triannual plan “Un mondo in comune”71, “A World 
in common”, approved by the Council of Ministers and endorsed by the CNCS in 
its first meeting in July 2015, underlines how every actor in the cooperation 
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system has to learn how to play a new role or to update his previous one, as the 
ability in being part of a team is the implicit “cultural challenge” of the whole 
plan. The Country has to “overcome a guilty carelessness towards its 
international projection”, informing its policies to the ones indicated by OSCE-
DAC and EU and proceed in organizing the needed information exchange. In 
project planning, implementation and evaluation, it’s foreseen to follow the 
relevant international guidelines and to strengthen coordination with EU and its 
MS about bilateral and multilateral actions, underlining funding options for 
“delegated cooperation”. The plan underlines the need for interventions coherent 
with national agenda, actors’ coordination, systematic diffusion of information 
and control. It stresses how economic development of partner Countries has also 
demonstrated positive effects for private and profit firms. A fundamental aim of 
Italian Foreign Politics, together with the international community, is the 
eradication of extreme poverty and, therefore, the work to sustainable growth, as 
set by the “2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development”, passed on September the 
25th, 2015, by the UNGA.  
In its Triannual Plan 2015-201772, the MAECI clearly shows a HS inspired 
action in the Italian Foreign Politics. The “First Strategic Area” is “Security and 
Rights”, underlining how State’s security can’t be achieved if not within a HS 
strategy. The Plan also recalls the “integration of European instruments within a 
renewed Atlantic Alliance”. It emphasizes, about “global governance”, how the 
complexity of international panorama makes some issues “elusive and hard to 
decode” and experience demonstrated the “inadequacy of solutions based on hard 
power alone, as well as those implying resorting to soft power only”. It also 
stresses the need to operate within the International Legal framework, avoiding 
unilaterality, detrimental to the whole international community. 
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2.3 The White Paper for International Security and Defence – “Our Defence”  
The Italian Defence is constantly changing, as it happens in every Country, 
in order to execute its tasks but, unlike other Countries, “Italy has not yet removed 
traditional weaknesses: insufficient awareness and attention toward the issue of 
international security, the inadequate elaboration of a thorough strategy in 
support of national interests, and the scarce attention given to the effectiveness of 
its means of intervention, starting with its Armed Forces”73.  After a debate 
engaging also Academia74, think tanks75 and Civil Society76, in April 2015, the 
Minister of Defence Roberta Pinotti handed over to the Supreme Defence Council 
the  “Libro Bianco per la Sicurezza Internazionale e la Difesa – La nostra 
Difesa” (WPD)77, indicating the Government’s stance on Defence. The wording 
clearly shows the Italian will to work through International Institutions of 
collective security, first of all with the UN (stated also in MAECI triannual plan). 
Some comments praised as a positive novelty the “political direction” of National 
Defence, while in the past “Governments often limited to ratify and fund decisions 
taken by the “apparats” bureaucratic, military and industrial”78, although other 
comments were less positive and criticism arose79, mainly about Defence 
industry80. 
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2.3.1. The Armed Force’s evolution 
One of the very first utterances shows an evolution of Defence, “State 
Security” concept, within a HS paradigm, “The Defence of the State, in fact, 
cannot and should not be limited exclusively to the indispensable action of the 
Armed Forces. It must be a unicum in which every segment of society, according 
to aptitude and ability, contributes to the creation of the broad and coordinated 
security framework that is a real guarantee of freedom for our nation”.  
It calls for the opportunity of a reasoning on the “adequacy of the governing 
bodies and their related support structures, developed over the years to deal with 
situations of crisis or emergency.” referring to the lack of needed normative 
provisions (see chapter 2.1) and it says how “It is, appropriate to study new 
solutions in order to ensure the rightful position of the delicate decision making 
process relating to the exercise of military force”. The strategic analysis and 
design of the WPD has so the purposes to: indicate which military component can 
best address the detected challenges; identify a sustainable Defence governance 
model; develop cultural and organizational elements to enable the Defence 
contribution to the Nation’s efforts in the wider, HS, security framework.  
The WBD underlines the massive downsizing the Armed Forces underwent 
in the last years, under strong budget constraints and stresses on the necessity to 
“strengthen the vital links” among Armed Forces and other State’s Organisations 
and “citizens in uniform” as a part of the whole population, so that a diffused 
“Defence culture” shall lead to a better decision-making on Defence matters. It is 
important to highlight how: “Addressing the problem of national security and 
Defence from a modern perspective requires a comprehensive and multi-
disciplinary approach”, so that “the concept of “Defence” can evolve, become 
broader, including all the different perspectives and skills involved in it”, 
integrating with “the so-called “third sector”, in particular with regards to the 
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role and functions of National Civil Service. In this effort, the underlying 
connecting element of the evolution is represented by the shared values which 
permeate the very existence of our nation”. Relations between citizens, 
institutions and Armed Forces should be based on “constant communication and 
assiduous interaction”, “transparency, public interest and constructive criticism 
the basis of the trusting relationship”, by sharing the same values framework. The 
WPD has so the “intention of contributing to the effort made by the entire national 
community”. After a threats analysis, he document outlines objectives of 
international security, designing national Defence, being European integration, 
transatlantic cohesion and global relations (it “recognizes the UN as the main and 
unavoidable reference for legitimacy, in particular with regards to issues of 
international security”) 
 
2.3.2.  Italian Defence priorities 
The priority for the Country is “The achievement of a high degree of 
stability and democratic development in the Countries that affect the 
Mediterranean”. So, “The Defence will contribute to the development of 
Government policies designed to ensure this objective by ensuring targeted 
military cooperation with all nations in the area”, “in order to build a broader 
context of security and stability over time”, a reference to the advice and assist 
missions81 (Iraq, Lebanon, Somalia). “If specific circumstances make it necessary, 
the Defence must be prepared to take direct responsibility, in response to crisis 
situations and be prepared to intervene for peace and stability in accordance with 
the decisions of the international community ”. “In some cases, Italy may also 
have to take on the responsibility of leading these operations”. “In accordance 
with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs it will also offers as a reference actor for 
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initiatives to be undertaken and continuing those already in progress in central 
Europe and the Balkans”. 
The Defence is defined as one of the “State's tools disposal”, planned to 
acquire, develop and sustain the skills suited to “understand the causes of modern 
conflict and the needs arising”, prevent “the emergence and consolidation of 
situations of risk or threats” and “intervene, to handle crisis situations”. The 
Missions of the Defence are (also contributing to EU actions):  
1- Defence of the state to safeguard national territory, so “the vital interests of 
the Nations”, “the security of areas of national sovereignty and of Italian 
citizens abroad” and “the security of lines of access to the nation”; 
2- Defence of the Euro-Atlantic and Euro-Mediterranean area, contributing to 
NATO's collective Defence and to maintain stability in these areas; 
3- Contribute to the development of peace and international security, in the 
context of international crisis management, to prevent and manage crises 
outside priority intervention area, in accordance with the UN Charter; 
4- Specific tasks and joint operations like in the event of natural disasters. 
The WPD emphasizes the “ability of the military component to pool 
resources and perform joint force and interGovernmental operations” as well as 
“In their contribution to humanitarian and rescue operations in the case of 
catastrophic events, the Armed Forces have demonstrated a versatile […] 
intervention capability even in the critical early stages”, which is going to be 
enhanced82, factoring also industrial, social, budget and environmental issues.  It 
notices the need to improve the adaptation process of Defence into the integrated 
“national system”, as the lessons learned process was not as efficient as wanted. 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
82
 12 Nov 2014 Legge navale: audizione del Capo di Stato maggiore della Marina militare 
Commissione Difesa http://webtv.senato.it/4191?video_evento=1268 
  41 
2.3.3. The future evolution 
It is indicated the need to ensure “the identification and understanding of all 
the actors involved in the area of operations, discriminating between enemies (in 
the Italian text “avversari”) and passive population, friendly military forces and 
civilian organizations” and how “Adopting a global intergovernmental approach 
to security and Defence issues, the Armed Forces will act to protect and 
safeguard populations, to develop and support the authorities and local forces 
and increase security and stability levels, working closely both with diplomatic 
personnel and other ministries personnel as well as from IO and NGOs.” all 
supported by an adequate information flow, analysis capability and strategic 
assessment. Significantly, it is stated how “it is still necessary to improve 
communication with the general public by sharing the aims, the scope and the 
actions of the armed forces, thus ensuring transparency and control.” and “more 
effort in order to speed up analytical and procedural changes, as well as changes 
in attitude and predisposition, at all levels and in all sectors” are needed.  
 About personnel, “The ability to interact in multicultural and complex 
environments, the ability to understand situations as well as a spirit of invention 
and adaptability to different environments, will be the main human characteristics 
in which to invest”. The need of reducing redundant and inefficient structures 
within the organization is stressed, as well as the imperative to proceed on a more 
marked jointness of the forces, also at multinational level, giving more powers to 
the CDS, especially in managing operations abroad. Interest to notice how “at the 
end of active service, general managers will not be able to work for companies in 
the Defence sector for a certain number of years in order to avoid any conflict of 
interest”. Defence schools will give access “to university students and other 
administrations’ employees, depending on interests and skills.” And military 
personnel with proper qualifications shall be employed outside the Defence 
sector, when deemed to be useful for the community. More efforts will be taken in 
incorporating younger and more educated personnel, as well as an increased 
number of women (implementing UNGA res. 1325) and in strengthening 
  42 
partnerships and ties between military personnel and communities. 
 The measures foreseen by the WPD are scheduled to undergo immediate 
implementation process, when not requiring legislative provisions, to submit to 
Parliamentary debate (on the issue, criticism arose83). Aside the, extremely 
important, “cultural shift” indicated by the WPD, it is important to remember how 
the national Armed Forces shall continue to be prepared for “traditional” conflicts, 
which are a risk “perceived as less likely today, but cannot be neglected because it 
can affect vital national interests, including the very survival of the State, more 
than any other circumstance”.  
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CHAPTER 3 
THE CIVIL PEACE CORPS PROJECT 
 
 
 
3.1 CPC Concept Development in Italy 
3.1.1. Alexander Langer 
 The concept of a Civil Peace Corps is kicked off, in Italy and Europe, by an 
idea of Alexander Langer, born in 1946 in Sterzing/Vipiteno, a small city in the 
Italian, but with a German-speaking population majority, Province of Alto 
Adige/Südtirol. A territory with a complex history and a very tense situation when 
Langer was young, which deeply influenced his thoughts about the equality 
among human beings, the cohabitation of different groups and the coexistence of  
diverse cultures and languages. He studied sociology at Trento University and, not 
allowing Italy, at the time, the conscientious objection, served as conscript in a 
Mountain Artillery Regiment. 
 After experiences in the leftist parties, Langer became one of the founders 
of the Green Party and then a member of the European Parliament. At the 
beginning of the Yugoslavian crisis, he pushed his efforts in negotiation initiatives 
towards the parties involved in conflict84, which anyway abrupted in the dreadful 
consequences we know. He defined himself85 as a “pacifist in the intentions”, as 
“nonviolence was an essential component of the pacification process, not being 
dogmatic or passive: was the constant exploration of ways alternative to violence, 
the support to those who were victims of violence”. He knew as a systematic use 
of coordinated violence against a civilian population, (by state or non-state actors 
like the semi-independent paramilitary militias in the Bosnian conflicts) couldn’t 
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have an answer other than military means, upholding in this reasoning the role of 
the collective security system towards humanitarian and protection means.  
 The experience of a “peace caravan” through Yugoslavia in 1992 was quite 
positive, while another in 1993 proved to entail too many risks. In 1995 he 
advanced the first proposal for a European Civilian Peace Corps (ECPC), to be 
employed in conflict transformation, as the “Bourlanges/Martin-report” states: “a 
first step towards a contribution to conflict prevention could be the establishment 
of a European Civil Peace Corps (including conscientious objectors) with 
training of monitors, mediators and specialists in conflict resolution”. 
Communications of EU Commission86 and Parliament87 followed, as well as 
studies concerning organizations, methods88 and also lessons identified review89.  
 
3.1.2. Antonio Papisca 
 A milestone in the implementation process of the Italian CPC, is the 
conceptualization work of Professor Antonio Papisca, University of Padua, 
proposed to the undersecretary of MAE90 in 2006 and explained in a Paper, 
meaningfully inspired by the “primacy of Human Rights, nonviolence and politics 
for conflicts resolution”91. Professor Papisca deals with the need of political 
authority retaining the full control of military operations, as per International Law, 
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while empowering the civilian component within peace missions and, 
furthermore, recognizsing interventions of NGO, volunteers and local actors. He 
also considers how there are two options in the employment of civilian personnel 
in peace missions, in military missions (of course, legitimate under International 
Law) and outside.  In the second case, he suggests how these interventions should 
be placed under the supervision of the Minister of Foreign Affairs’ authority, 
seeing the military not as a State’s “power”, but as a tool, to be used with the aim 
of achieving legitimate objectives.  The Legal framework for CPC establishment 
is given by Articles 10 and 11 of the Italian Constitution92, being “recognition of 
International Law” and “rejection of war” giving a concrete contribution to the 
formal status of “peace loving State”, as per Art.4 of the UN Charter. 
 He then draws on Art. 52 Cost. “Defence of the Fatherland is a Sacred 
Duty” and Art. 1 Law 64/200193 on the National Civil Service as “Defence of the 
Fatherland with non-military means and activities”, with the active participation 
in the promotion of HR of SCO, as per art. 2 Cost, “inviolable rights of the 
person, as an individual and in the social groups within which human personality 
is developed”. This goes in shifting the “State Security” paradigm of “si vis pacem 
para bellum” to a HS paradigm of “si vis pacem para pacem”, to which State 
Security has to be a functional instrument, to “fully realize” the rights of every 
person, as per Art. 28 UDHR. After recalling other principles of International Law 
(already mentioned in chapter 1.1), Professor Papisca warns on the dangerous 
interpretations given to Art.51 of the UN Charter. These concerns are a matter of 
fact also today, given the recent bombings and “targeted” or “extra-judicial 
killings” carried in Syria by the United Kingdom94 and France95, under Art.51. 
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The document recalls the cost-benefit supremacy of prevention over 
intervention, advocating for the HS functions of civilian and military components, 
also face to International Justice and summarizes international and Italian 
experiences of peace building, tracing then the areas of intervention of CPC:  
- “Crisis” areas, where conflicts of different kinds, instability, lack of 
democracy and violation of Human Rights, noticing potential linkages 
and overlaps between CPC and Development Cooperation; 
- Conflict transformation, being the specific task of CPC, to prevent 
escalations through interposition, mediation, dialogue facilitation, 
information, communication and co-education; 
- Post-conflict peacebuilding. 
Significantly, is underlined the principle of the consent of local 
communities to the CPC interventions and how, unlike civilian members of 
international missions, the “peace worker” operates and lives in the territory, 
together with the local population and in particular with the vulnerable groups. In 
order to be welcomed by the local population, it is important for peace operators 
intervene autonomously from Governmental actions and “multinazionali 
rapinatorie”, “predatory multinationals”, in support to local partners. Links with 
Governments are not excluded, but have to be carefully evaluated. 
In a deeper examination of the roles of civilian members of institutional 
missions and members of CPC, is advocated a shared vision of “civil society” 
among all, so to have a “peace mission’s civic defender”, to overview the conduct 
of mission’s personnel, both military and civilian. The conclusion considers the 
opportunity of a “special passport” for peace operators, the need for a gender 
balance, the opportunity for the CPC to be the Italian contribution to the European 
Civil Peace Corps, and the need of creating a permanent system, able to manage 
and handle the CPC training, employment and doctrine. 
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3.2 International experiences 
Here a brief description of the main experiences and programs, at the 
international level, about peace and Human Rights. 
“The United Nations Volunteers (UNV) programme is the UN entity that 
contributes to peace and development through volunteerism worldwide. UNV 
mobilizes action-oriented volunteers to make an impact in the peace and 
development programmes of the United Nations, and is a global advocate for the 
recognition of volunteerism”96. They are employed in UNDP development 
projects. The program is organized on International, National and Youth 
Volunteers, the first and second components with high or medium technical 
qualifications and experiences in the fields needed by development projects and 
deployed up to 24 months. The third component, aged 18-29, is made up of 
volunteers recruited among Universities and deployed on a 6-months basis. 
The “Cascos Blancos”, White Helmets, are based on an Argentinian 
initiative of 1993, when President Menem decided to give an Argentinian 
contribution to Humanitarian Aid and development, as a “pre-identified, standby 
and trained national volunteer corps”, nowadays including tasks involving 
rehabilitation and reconstruction and risk management and resilience, also in 
Argentina. They are recognized by UN97, for “humanitarian relief, rehabilitation 
and technical cooperation for development (document A/67/L.32)”. The “White 
Helmets Commission”98 is part of the Argentinian MoFA, answering to UN and 
OAS calls for contribution with a focus on developing local partners. Volunteer’s 
training is provided by the Ministry of Defence in a specific structure99. 
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3.2.1. European Voluntary Humanitarian Aid Corps 
Article 214 TEU foresees a European Voluntary Humanitarian Aid Corps, 
mentioned in chapter 1.3 and established by EU Reg 375/2014100. Volunteering is 
defined as “a concrete and visible expression of solidarity allowing individuals to 
dedicate their knowledge, skills and time to the service of fellow human beings, 
without pecuniary motivation”.  Interventions should be aimed to “immediate, 
effective, efficient and coherent response and to support third Country local 
communities”, focussing so on DRR, resilience development and Development 
Cooperation, with reference to Humanitarian Principles. Significant care is given 
to personnel training “providing European standards and procedures […] 
commonly agreed benchmarks for training and preparation […], a database of 
potential volunteers”, which is going to be evaluated prior of intervention. Also 
personnel security is deemed “of paramount importance and be subject to regular 
exchange of information, including with Member States. EU Aid Volunteers 
should not be deployed to operations conducted in the theatre of international and 
non-international armed conflicts”. Great consideration is given to implementing 
organisations: “ensure ownership by the actors in the field and to maximise the 
potential uptake of the actions under that initiative”. It recalled the Commission’s 
Communication on Corporate Social Responsibility, as “private companies can 
play an important role and contribute to the Union's humanitarian operations, in 
particular through employee volunteering”. The Regulation calls (Art.6) for 
“Coherence and complementarities of Union Action”, in external action, in 
particular with Humanitarian Aid, Development Cooperation and civil protection 
“avoiding duplication and overlap” and field coordination with UN OCHA. The 
organisation of EU Aid Volunteers is ongoing101 and, stemming from Art.217 
TEU, seems to defer to unforeseen developments the establishment of an ECPC. 
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3.2.2. United States of America’s Peace Corps 
US Peace Corps have been created in 1961 and their scopes are “technical” 
aid to Countries requesting it, contributing to promote understanding of 
Americans by other peoples and vice-versa. The deployment is scheduled to be 
24-months long. Being a 50-years old program, there have been calls for 
reformation, as the political aims which prompted its institution are completely 
gone, so that an adaptation to the 21st century is being advocated102, in 2003 and 
2008. Moreover, some scandals and problems through the years casted shadows 
on how programs are handled103. The reform shall lie on nine principles being: 
don not harm, demand-driven, “All-American engagement” (to reduce 
deployment, enabling older people to participate), flexible, technologically savvy, 
partnership with other organisations, engagement with “rising powers” and urban 
communities (instead of rural) and massive budget increase, that would be 
anyway way long cheaper than military expenses. Among the possible options, it 
was considered: “Moving the Peace Corps into the private sector where it would 
be less vulnerable to political pressures and have the greatest possible flexibility.” 
The one which gained more support was anyway “Putting the Peace Corps at the 
center of a new Corporation for International Study and Service”. Also, a 
considered option was “Promoting volunteer service by foreigners in American 
communities would be a critical part of the Corporation’s mandate to build 
bridges with the rest of the world and move beyond the paternalistic one-way 
pattern of the past”. 
 
3.2.3. German Civil Peace Service 
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The “Ziviler Friedensdienst”104, German Civil Peace Service (CPS) is, with 
regard to Conflict transformation (so to influence conflict dynamics by working 
“on conflict”), probably the closest to the Italian Concept, in a vision of Positive 
Peace and adopting an Action Research approach105. The CPS is a Consortium of 
GO and NGO, financed by German Ministry for Cooperation106. It dialogues with 
local organisations in creating, “strengthen information and communication 
structures that trace the causes and consequences of violent conflict (including 
monitoring the development of conflicts)”, provides assistance to marginalized 
groups, and promotes HR and peace education. The strategic rationale of CPS, 
is107: “CPS projects alone cannot prevent or end armed conflict. It is only in 
combination with coherent contributions made by other policy fields, […] at the 
national and international levels and in close cooperation with other players in 
the conflict regions in question that the prevention of violence can become a 
reality. The advantage of CPS as an instrument is that civil society players are 
able to complement Governmental initiatives but can work independently of the 
Government at a variety of social level.” In CPS interventions, “there is a close 
link between Development Cooperation and civil conflict management. 
Development inevitably means changing the status quo and thus, changing the 
constellation of political and economic interests” so that conflict management and 
transformation has to take into account economic development activities. A great 
importance is dedicated to Networking, among CPS organizations, local partners, 
other development organizations and with the German mission, in meetings 
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dealing not only with security situation, but also jointly monitoring the conflict 
situation (developments with regard to the potential for peace and conflict), as an 
important step towards more coherent responses from local and international 
players.” About personnel “CPS experts must not only possess commitment, but 
also professional and life experience”, highly skilled in respective fields, varying 
due to the assignment. They are recruited through a wide network of CSO and 
NGO, in all of Germany. In training professional into conflict transformation 
techniques, The Academy for Conflict Transformation 108 has been created. An 
important structure in Germany for training personnel to be employed also under 
UN, EU and OSCE umbrella, is the, Center for International Peace Operations, 
ZIF109.  This centre is the lead of “Europe’s New Training Initiative for Civilian 
Crisis Management”110  (ENTRi), aiming to prepare personnel to CMO and thus 
to improve HS. It has been created in 2008 “to support the comprehensive 
approach of international peace support operations at the national level”, so that 
its platform is supported by the Armed Forces, Police, Development Cooperation, 
MOI, MEF and MOJ. “The close cooperation among the training institutions and 
the joint preparation of experts for deployment strengthens the mutual 
understanding of the roles of civilian, police and military personnel in a mission”. 
Important to highlight the role of European Peacebuilding Liaison Office 
(EPLO)111, independent civil society platform of European NGOs and think tanks 
committed to peacebuilding and conflict prevention. It aims to influence EU and 
MS112 on HS, foreign policy and peace building issues. 
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3.3 Evolution of CPC concept within the Italian National Civilian Service  
3.3.1. Evolution of the National Civilian Service 
After the CSO experiences during the Bosnian conflict, which saw an 
extensive involvement on GO, IGO and NGO in development projects, as well as 
UN and NATO peacekeeping deployments, Italian CSO engaged in nonviolent 
initiatives in Palestine and Congo, many served into the “Peace Brigades 
International”113 and “Nonviolent Peaceforce”114, in “attempts to realize the 
Ganghian Shanti Sena/Peace Army concept”. 
Under the institutional profile, the Italian situation saw a long development 
process, driving the recognition of Civilian Service as, among other features, 
“concurring to the Defence of the Fatherland with non-military means and 
activities”, promoting the realization of the constitutional principles of social 
solidarity and cooperation at national and international level, including social, 
people and peace services: 
- Articles 11 and 52 of the Constitution, Art. 117 (“The State has 
exclusive legislative powers in […] foreign policy […] Defence and 
armed forces; State Security”)115; 
- Law 772/1972116, allowing in Italy the conscientious objection, 
important also the Constitutional Court Rulings 53/1967 and 164/1985; 
- Laws 230/1998117 on the Civilian Service instead of Conscription; 
- Law 331/2000118 on the institution of the Professional Military Service; 
- Law 64/2001119 instituting the Voluntary Civilian Service; 
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- D.Lgs. 77/2002120, Civilian Service Abroad. 
- Law 226/2004121 stay condition of the Conscription system; 
- Constitutional Court Rulings 228/04, 229/04 and 431/05, about the 
organization of Civilian Service by regional administrations122. 
Law 230/1998, Art. 8 c.2 l. “e” entrusted to the National Civilian Service 
Office (“Ufficio Nazionale per il Servizio Civile”, SCN Office, established within 
the Presidency of the Council of the Ministers, then developed into the 
“Dipartimento della Gioventù e del Servizio Civile Nazionale”123, a Department 
subordinated to the same Presidency) to “research, together with the Civil 
Protection Department, forms of research and experimentation of forms of civil 
Defence, non armed and nonviolent”124. In 1999, the Cemiss “Centro Militare 
Studi Strategici”, “Military Strategic Studies Centre”, commissioned a study on 
“Civilian Defence and the White Helmets Project – Civilian not-armed 
peacekeepers”125.  
 
3.3.2. The DCNAN Committee 
After several steps, in 2004 was instituted126 the “Consultative Committee 
for Civilian Defence Not Armed and Nonviolent”, (“Comitato di Consulenza per 
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la Difesa Civile Non Armata e Nonviolenta”, DCNAN Committee)127, with 
members from several State Institutions, Ministries and Academic experts. The 
Committee (President since February 2005, Professor Pierluigi Consorti128, Pisa 
University, who took the place of Professor Antonino Drago, teaching in the same 
University) was tasked to elaborate analysis, draft reports, promote initiatives 
aimed to enable the SCN Office to experiment forms of DCNAN. It seems 
important to underline the Committee’s contributions to the SCN with the 
following works: 
- Study on peacekeeping and peace research civilian education 
activities129, last update in  July 2008;   
- Criteria of projects’ evaluation  of Civilian Service abroad130, 2005; 
- Guidelines for the training of Civilian Service Volunteers131, 2006, 
updated in 2008 and confirmed in 2013132; 
- Seminary on the evolution of the concept of Fatherland’s Defence133, in 
May 2005, leading to the release, during a press conference in 2006, of a 
document, “The DCNAN”134; Important to notice how, despite the 
speech of General Biagio Abrate “I can say today, despite my training, 
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how weapons are not always essential in some crisis scenarios, on the 
contrary, sometimes could be detrimental”, Defence representatives 
formally expressed a “dissenting opinion” on some contents. General 
Abrate135 was at the time head of the MoD Minister’s Cabinet and 
became CDS from January 2011 to January 2013, delivering the address 
to Military senior leadership about “Comprehensive Approach”, which 
is referred in Chapter 2.1136. 
- In 2011, the Committee proposed, on a strict budget base137, a DCNAN 
pilot project, taken up by “Associazione Comunità Papa Giovanni 
XXIII”138, and SCN Office launched a special selection call for 6 
volunteers to be employed in Albania in the project “White helmets 
beyond vengeances”. 
The Committee ceased its activities at the end of 2011, after the “spending 
review” cuts139 and diverging considerations arose140 on the issue, as well as 
replies141 and comments142.  
 In 2011, a conference took place in Vicenza, dealing with “prevention of 
armed conflicts and training of CPC”143. The initiative prompted out from the 
movements opposing to US military presence in Naples and Vicenza144, abrupted 
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after the beginning of the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. The proposed 
initiative was the establishment of a “Center for the forecast and prevention of 
armed conflicts and CPC training”145. 
In May 2013, a Law Proposal146 was presented before the Chamber of the 
Deputies, proposing the establishment of a “Istituto superiore di studi per la 
formazione, la ricerca e l’intervento per la costruzione di processi di pace, la 
trasformazione nonviolenta dei conflitti e la promozione dell’eguaglianza 
sociale”, “Superior School of Studies for training, research and intervention into 
peacebuilding processes, nonviolent conflict transformation and social equality 
promotion”. The Institute should train social facilitators and peace workers, 
liaising with a number of associations and Institutions, including Defence. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE ITALIAN CPC INSTITUTIONALISATION PATH  
 
 
 
4.1 The Italian CPC Experiences  
4.1.1. “White Helmets against Vengeances”, CPC Experimental Project 
The CPC pilot project in Albania, based on the principles of research-action, 
took place between October 2011 and October 2012, being particularly important 
due to the subsequent elaboration process147, conducted with the support of the 
“Human Rights Center” of Padua University148, headed by Professor Marco 
Mascia. Some of the outcomes emerged from the field work have been: the 
importance of violence escalation prevention; the needed nonviolence, the 
performance of a participative conflict transformation taking to confidence 
building, especially in women, youth and marginalized people; focus on the 
operators formation, also during the project. It has been noticed how, in conflict 
transformation actions, conducted in places where young people needs to be 
engaged, the relatively young age of the operators, or at least a number of them, is 
an asset of great importance in order to successfully deliver the interventions.  
The CPC pilot project had, by a matter of fact, joined an already existing 
intervention, initiated within NGO/CSO initiatives named “Interventi Civili di 
Pace”, “Civilian Peace Interventions”, CPI. In that case, the initiative was 
“Operazione Colomba”, “Operation Dove”149 which is currently ongoing and is 
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continuously improving, under doctrinal, practical and methodological points of 
view, improving action’s policies and organisation’s efficiency, increasing so the 
intervention’s impact150, hence showing a good organisational learning process. 
In the meantime, as said, Italian CSO and NGO lived many experiences of 
non-institutional Civilian Peace Interventions, among them, the “Comunità di 
Sant’Egidio”, “Rete Caschi Bianchi”, “Rete Corpi Civili di Pace” and others151. 
In 2007, with the aim of coordinating efforts among MAE, SNC and SCO, the 
“CPI Table” was established, with an informal format and a wide agreed consent 
base, which provided for an advocacy action on related issues during 2013 
elections’152 campaign. The same Operation Dove is staged also in Lebanon, 
Palestine, Colombia and other Countries. 
 
4.1.2. Identity and criteria of Civil Peace Interventions 
In 2012 the “Table” produced a Document153, on the identity and criteria of 
Italian CPI (non-institutionalised CPC, but there is no commonly agreed 
distinction, by a matter of fact). Basic principles are: nonviolence, independence 
(from political influence), impartiality (towards parties in conflict), non-
interference (towards local NGO), gender equity, respect for local culture, simple 
lifestyle (as closer as possible to local population’s one) with an example-led 
promotion of resources and structures sharing. Among action fields, HR and 
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Identità e Criteri degli Interventi Civili di Pace Italiani Tavolo Interventi Civili di Pace 
Roma: 10 giugno 2012 http://www.interventicivilidipace.org/wp/wp-
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electoral monitoring, mediation, confidence and reconciliation building, 
advocacy, nonviolent escort, peace education, empowerment, capacity and 
community building, DDR assistance and “Do not harm approach” consulting.  
Planning process and code of conduct are entrusted to the organisations; 
security issues are coordinated with military or civilian agencies, keeping Italian 
authorities informed of their movements. Operators are volunteers, able to operate 
in conflict situations, conflict-prevention and post conflict reconciliation; on 
conflict situations, facilitating conflict transformation. Generally speaking, long-
term remunerated operators are coupled by shorter-term volunteer operators. 
Adequate formation and training is given by the associations. 
About institutional relations, CPI could be under institutional mandate, 
defining objectives and political direction, while delegating planning, organization 
and conduct to the associations; under institutional aegis, approving mission’s 
objectives and leaving then freedom of action to the associations; publicly-funded 
only. Connections shall be maintained with SCN Office, MAE DGCS, MOI or 
local authorities, depending on the interventions.  
 
4.1.3. Locally organised CPI 
Also interesting the involvement of local administrations, most notably the 
Municipality of Naples, in the project “Corpi Civili di Pace in Kosovo”, in 
2012154, with the objective of “transferring the acquired experiences back home”, 
due to the direct interest of promoting local administration into “handling of 
discords among communities and contrast to widespread conflicts”155156. The 
project had a follow-up, in the same area, the “P.U.L.S.A.R. Project”, purporting 
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 Corpi civili di pace Ebook di Gianmarco Pisa edizione Multimage 
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the concept of “cultural peace building”157, entailing the development of 
narratives, able to raise awareness on the possibility of different and positive 
relationships among communities158. 
The organisation of ICP and CPC actions, is, generally speaking, aimed to 
support local CSO or community-based organisations, in a sustainable HS 
paradigm. In the conflict transformation processes it is recognisable, at individual 
level, an epistemological approach proper of qualitative social research methods, 
like participant observation, translated into participatory action. At the 
organisational level, qualitative/quantitative mixed approaches show up.  
The associations, depending on the actions that ICP are conducting, manage 
advocacy policies and engage public opinion and decision makers, aiming to 
gather a more widespread awareness on the issues dealt with and, therefore, 
generate a positive posture towards it. This, having the final goal of tensions de-
escalation, thus positively transforming the conflict.  
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4.2 The fist Legislative step 
4.2.1. The “Marcon Amendment” 
Law 147/2013159, comma 253, making reference to Law 64/2001, provides 
funding to the experimental institution of a CCP contingent, aiming to form 500 
youths for three years, 2014, 2015 and 2015, with a financial base of 3 millions 
Euros, to be deployed to perform non-Governmental peace actions in conflict 
areas, or areas suffering for environmental emergencies. Contingent’s 
organisation is settled as per Art.12 D.Lgs. 77/2002. Some positive comments 
appeared on press news160, although the promoter of the Amendment, Member of 
the Chamber of Deputies Giulio Marcon, received feedbacks on how CCP 
implementation should not be related to the SCN161, probably due to the 
consecuent shortnesses in terms of “permanent” or, anyway, long-term operators. 
The Law Proposal (C.1981) was then submitted on January the 21st, 2014162. Until 
October 2015, the proposal has not been discussed. 
In February 2014, a Law Proposal163 was posted before the Chamber of the 
Deputies, about the institution of a Compulsory Civilian Service. In the same 
month, the President of the Italian Republic Giorgio Napolitano appointed the 
Mayor of Florence City, Matteo Renzi, as new PM, replacing PM Enrico Letta, 
despite some disagreements164. PM Renzi confirmed the delegation of powers on 
the Information and Security Services to the Undersecretary Marco Minniti165 
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(Degree in Philosophy), who had had previous assignments within Defence, 
internal affairs, and interministerial coordination during the Kosovo crisis. 
Always in February 2014, a National Convention, “La miglior Difesa è la 
Pace”166 , “The best Defence is Peace”, took place in Rimini, outlining interesting 
developments on CPC, some of them are going to be dealt with in next chapters.  
In March 2014, the ICP Table submitted a contribution on the implementation of 
the “Marcon Amendment”, underlining the need of a proper monitoring and 
evaluation structure167.  
 
4.2.2. CPC National Convention, July 2014 
A national convention on CPC took place at Padua University, the 8th of 
July, 2014, where several issues were discussed. Among them, the need to 
integrate the different actions through networking, to innovate the projects by 
working on the lessons identified and to motivate and give recognition to the 
operators, who are the projects’ strength. The Undersecretary of the MoL Luigi 
Bobba, with regard to the time needed to start the experimentation, stressed about 
the lack of communication among actors, even among institutional actors and the 
need of providing an adequate security frame to the operators, as well as giving a 
proper training when employed in conflict areas. He called for an increase in the 
numbers of SCN, both in personnel and funding.  
The undersecretary highlighted the credibility that Italy gained in the 
international arena, thanks to the military personnel deployed abroad, and 
emphasized how CPC shall and should become an extremely valuable soft power 
asset. Therefore, the need to coordinate interventions with MAECI. During the 
meeting, the need of a participative approach instead of imposing was stressed. 
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Also, light was shed on the possibility to detach CPC from SCN, as the latter 
deals with different issues, although areas of intervention could overlap. The 
opportunity of seeing the final publication of the WPD and the reform of the 
Development Cooperation, to clearly define CPC’s frame, was also pointed out. 
 
4.2.3. Political and security developments 
In early August, 2014 two Italian girls, Vanessa Marzullo and Greta 
Ramelli, were reported missing in Syria168, abducted by an unidentified armed 
group. The issue raised widespread concern among the public opinion, worried 
about them (as well as for other kidnapped nationals) and stunned by the presence 
of two Italian girls in a war-torn Country, on their personal initiative, while 
volunteering outside the recognized IO/NGO/CSO network169. After a heated 
debate around volunteers on press170 and social networks171, clearly not always 
based on objective facts172 they were brought back to Italy on the 16th of January 
2015. Rumors spread about Italy paying a ransom to the Islamist group Al-Nusra, 
amounting to the sum of 12 millions Euros. The Minister of MAECI Paolo 
Gentiloni, reporting  to the Parliament about the events, on the same day, wanted 
to “thank especially the intelligence services, which worked with courage and 
professionalism, the UDC and all the authorities involved in a teamwork that 
produced an outstanding result”173 (see chapter 2.1). Among other considerations, 
                                                 
 
168
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the members of the Chamber expressed unease about the safety of national abroad 
in conflict areas and Member of the Chamber Paolo Alli stated how “it’s not 
possible to prevent everything and it’s unfair to prevent generosity, but it should 
be sought to prevent imprudence”. Minister Gentiloni rejected the rumors of 
ransom paying as “allegiations”. 
In October 2014, the “Centro Studi Difesa Civile”, “Centre of Civilian 
Defence Studies”, held a seminary174 on identity, sinergies and advocacy 
strategies about CPC, considering the need to review some concepts, including to 
evaluate the impact of “integrated/comprehensive approaches” on CPC.  
The 31st of January, 2015, Presidential elections chose Constitutional Court 
Judge Sergio Mattarella175, former University Professor, Member of Parliament 
and Minister of the Education, as the Twelth President of the Italian Republic. 
Among his career’s assignments, the roles of Delegated Authority to the Secret 
Services and Minister of Defence, while the Kosovo situation escalated to war. 
In a press Conference chaired by the Minister of Labour Giuliano Poletti, 
the 2nd of February, 2015, the Government officially presented the CPC176 to the 
public. The Undersecretary of MAECI177 Mario Giro, considered how youth 
always strives towards a meaning, and “the Italian State never abandons his 
citizens abroad, even less when they are in danger, no matter what pushed them to 
go”. Moreover, he pointed out how CPC “are not meant to operate into combat 
areas, as the interventions’ primary goal is to do it away with violence from the 
conflictual context”. He concluded by saying how CPC proposal “gives to the 
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youth the possibility to participate, support and get passionate with chunks of the 
world”.  Minister Poletti declared how the idea is to build an infrastructure and a 
procedure, intended to enable the great potential of Italian social engagement to 
express itself to its best. This, in order to have private commitment coupled with 
the public one, being individual efforts more effective when included into a 
system. 
April the 23rd, 2015, US President Barack Obama gave a speech announcing 
how, during a targeted killing operation carried by a US UAV against Al-Qaeda’s 
personnel, died Giovanni Lo Porto178, Italian Humanitarian Operator, as like as 
another US prisoner. He pointed out how US officials didn’t know about the 
presence of the two men held captive in the strike area before the attack, aimed to 
eliminate two US citizens holding leadership positions within Al-Qaeda.  
US President Obama expressed his and America’s sorrow, while claiming 
full responsibility for the event, as President and Commander-in-Chief. 
Italian President Mattarella praised Lo Porto’s engagement as a builder of 
peace and solidarity. He also expressed fondness towards the Development 
Cooperation’s operators, more exposed to risks due to the worsening of crisis 
situations. PM Matteo Renzi stated how loss of the hostage’s lives were a 
terrorist’s responsibility. 
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4.3 The current context   
4.3.1. The Ministerial Decree, May 2015 
Ministerial Decree 07/05/2015179 of the “Ministero del Lavoro e delle 
Politiche Sociali”, the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies, in coordination 
with the MAECI, taking into account relevant National and International Laws 
and Regulations, disciplines the organisation of CPC’s experimental contingent, 
authorized by Law 147/2013.  
The Decree defines CPC experimentation as realized by mean of projects 
submitted by associations, already implementing SCN actions since three years at 
least and, departing from the second year, could include the secondment of 
operators to International Organisations.  
CPC activities are performed in conflict areas, or areas vulnerable to 
conflicts. CPC intervention fields are: 
a) Processes of democratization, mediation and reconciliation; 
b) Support to local civil society’s technical capabilities, also by activating 
linkages among people, organisations and institutions, aiming to conflict 
solving; 
c) HR and IHL monitoring; 
d) Humanitarian activities, including refugees and migrants support, social 
reintegration of ex-combatants, facilitation of dialogue among refugees, 
migrants and host communities; 
e) Peace education; 
f) Support to civilian populations facing environmental emergencies, 
including prevention and management of conflicts that these 
emergencies could trigger; 
CPC activities shall be performed in Italy and abroad, after issuing the 
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guidelines of a special call for projects, detailing the areas of intervention and the 
required personnel. The volunteers will be aged 18-28 and can’t be members of 
military or police forces. 
The volunteers will undergo a training of at least 100 hours, followed by a 
coaching of at least 70 hours in the intervention area. The organising associations 
shall partner with relevant Universities, research centres or other Italian or 
International Organisations, on the basis of relevant expertise the projects may 
require. A “train the trainers” course shall be organised on the second 
experimentation year. 
Employment abroad is subordinated to MAECI evaluations and the 
volunteers must undergo security awareness activities, as well as to take part to 
security briefings in the intervention areas. The association’s organisers will have 
to provide liaison betweem them, the MAECI and the volunteers, while retaining 
responsibility on them. Moreover, in case of violations of security obligations by a 
volunteer, actions shall be taken, including her or his repatriation. Misconducts or 
negligence on security matters could entail charging the related costs, incurred by 
the administration, for rescue and relief actions on the volunteer or the 
association. The Decree establishes a “Monitoring and evaluation Committee”, 
chaired by the Head of Department, and composed also by one representative of 
MAECI, two SCN National Consult’s members and four associations’ 
representatives. The Committee is tasked with defining the project’s monitoring 
and evaluation criteria and the adoption of a code of CPC’s interventions ethics.  
May the 22nd, 2015, a Law Proposal by popular initiative was presented 
before the Chamber of the Deputies (Proposal C. 3142)180, about the "Istituzione e 
modalità di finanziamento del Dipartimento della Difesa Civile non armata e 
nonviolenta", “Institution and funding of the non-armed and nonviolent Civil 
                                                 
 
180
 PROPOSTA DI LEGGE D'INIZIATIVA POPOLARE: "Istituzione e modalità di 
finanziamento del Dipartimento della Difesa Civile non armata e nonviolenta" (3142) 
http://www.camera.it/leg17/126?tab=1&leg=17&idDocumento=3142&sede=&tipo= 
  68 
Defence”. The proposal foresees the institution of the above mentioned 
Department, within the PCM, having responsibility over the CPC and a “Peace 
and Disarmament Research Institute”, to be defined by a following Law. The 
Department would have to liaise and cooperate with the Departments of SCN, 
“Fire Fighters, Public Relief and Civil Defence” and Civil Protection. Moreover, a 
“DCNAN National Council” shall be established. The Law Proposal has not been 
dealt with, up to the 9th of October, 2015. 
 
4.3.2. Further Political and security developments 
July the 1st, 2015, the Official Gazette published Constitutional Court ruling 
119/2015181, declaring illegitimate to exclude non Italian citizens, regularly 
resident in Italy, from the Voluntary Civilian Service. 
July the 11th, 2015182, a bomb blew the building hosting the Italian Embassy 
in Cairo, Egypt, while the building was empty, so it caused no Italian casualties. 
July the 14th, 2015, an Amendment to Law Draft “N 1917” 183 was proposed 
by Senator Nicola Latorre. The Amendment was about entrusting to the PM the 
possibility to give to Defence assets – hence, military personnel and units – the 
functional guarantees proper of Information and Security Services members. This, 
in cases of “crisis or emergencies concerning national security, or for the 
protection to citizens abroad”, in close coordination with the COPASIR184. A 
heated debate took place among the Parliament and on the press,185 as doubts186 
                                                 
 
181
Sentenza della Corte Costituzionale numero 119 del 2015 
 http://www.cortecostituzionale.it/actionSchedaPronuncia.do?anno=2015&numero=119 
182
Egitto: Gentiloni, bomba consolato non diretta solo a Italia 
https://www.agi.it/estero/notizie/egitto_gentiloni_bomba_consolato_non_diretta_solo_a_italia-
201507131432-est-rt10084 
183
MISURE DI INTELLIGENCE E PER LA GESTIONE DELLE CRISI Art. 18-bis. 
(Disposizion in materia di intelligence), Emendamento Latorre, page 63 
http://www.senato.it/leg/17/BGT/Schede/FascicoloSchedeDDL/ebook/45653.pdf 
184
 MISURE DI INTELLIGENCE E PER LA GESTIONE DELLE CRISI 
Art. 18-bis. http://parlamento17.openpolis.it/emendamento/154005 
185
 “Militari come gli 007”, ma è scontro sulla legge per i poteri speciali 
http://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2015/07/23/news/_militari_come_gli_007_ma_e_scontro_sulla_l
egge_per_i_poteri_speciali-119636806/?refresh_ce Repubblica.it 
  69 
about amendment’s costitutionality were raised187. After talkings, was ascertained 
how such measures shall be taken only in cases of exceptional urgency, by mean 
of a PM’s Decree, to be reviewed by the COPASIR, which should anyway be 
preventively asked for advice. This, in order to ensure the proper constitutionality 
of the measures taken and the parliamentary, thus democratic, control over them. 
The amendment was lately approved188, although implementation process and 
clear command control and communication procedures will need to be 
established, in case the Law will be passed. The issue was widely debated by the 
Senate on September 15th. 
In July and August 2015, the feeling about the need of increasing 
intelligence management efficiency189, boosted among Parliament and public 
opinion, also with regard to internal security. This, due to the arrest of two alleged 
“lone wolves terrorists”190 and the unauthorized helicopter flight over the city of 
Rome, during the funeral Mr. Vittorio Casamonica191. Measures ensuring a better 
coordination of Law Enforcement Forces and Public Order and Security Agencies 
were announced. Furthermore, due to the “Hacking Team”192 case, the issue of 
cyber security became known to the general public. 
                                                                                                                                     
 
186
 Il governo italiano vuole trasformare le forze speciali in 007 (che significa?) 
http://www.formiche.net/2015/07/24/il-governo-italiano-vuole-trasformare-le-forze-speciali-007-
che-significa/ 
187
 Militari e intelligence, a chi piace (e a chi no) l’emendamento Latorre - Pierri – formiche.net 
http://www.formiche.net/2015/07/23/latorre-militari-servizi-segreti-emendamento/ 
188
 Militari come 007, vi spiego perché è cosa buona e giusta. Parla Latorre (Pd) 
http://www.formiche.net/2015/07/24/militari-intelligence-latorre-presidente-consiglio-renzi/ 
189
 Salto di qualità dell’Intelligence contro il terrorismo liquido 
http://www.sicurezzanazionale.gov.it/sisr.nsf/archivio-notizie/salto-di-qualita-dell-intelligence-
contro-il-terrorismo-liquido.html 
190
 Vi spiego come i nostri 007 stanno fermando Isis. Parla Andrea Margelletti 
http://www.formiche.net/2015/07/22/isis-brescia-arresti-terroristi-islam-intelligence/ 
191
 Calende greche per rafforzare i radar anti terrorismo? 
http://www.formiche.net/2015/08/27/radar-enac-riggio-prefetto-gabrielli-comitato-ordine-
sicurezza-2/ 
192
 Hacking Team: tra i clienti dei tecno-spioni di Milano anche servizi segreti, PolPost e 
Carabinieri http://www.corriere.it/tecnologia/15_luglio_09/hacking-team-polizia-postale-
carabinieri-finanza-libano-clienti-08ab5e08-264c-11e5-9a08-f80f881ecc8e.shtml 
  70 
The 9th of September, 2015, the MAECI hosted a Conference193, chaired by 
the Minister Gentiloni, on the topic “Security is a serious thing”. The aim was to 
disseminate194 a document, prepared in cooperation and agreement with ONG 
networks, dealing with risk management abroad. The principle of association’s 
responsible person, maintaining reliable contact with the personnel, while liaising 
with the diplomatic presence in the Country, was reaffirmed. The conference 
underlined how, many times, in some Countries the ONG/CSO presence is the 
only Italian one, so that their operators can be extremely important in getting a 
better awareness and understanding of the situation. This would enable an 
informed decision making, especially in cases of particular need.   
September the 23rd, 2015, a “discussion table”195 took place, to make the 
point of the situation with regard to CPC experimentation. Member of the 
Chamber Giulio Marcon expressed concern about the possibility to keep up with 
scheduled, and participants asked the Government to make possible the 
deployment of the first volunteers’ contingent before the end of 2006. 
He said how the Law Proposal, which has been agreed by 70 Parliament 
Members of different political parties, “will be considered as soon as possible” 
and remarked how the proposal foresees training for at least 400 hours. Moreover, 
it envisions the possibility to include into the projects Volunteers aged from 18 to 
65. He stressed how this would be a considerable asset in engaging with almost all 
the age cohorts, a quite important feature when dealing with vulnerable groups. 
Undersecretary of the MoL Luigi Bobba was confident with keeping the 
project on schedule, although he noticed many difficulties to overcome. The main 
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one, being to define precisely the tasks to be given to the Volunteers, considering 
the difficult conditions of the places where they will operate. Particular concern 
was expressed about the security issues and the need to manouvre within the rules 
set by the SCN abroad. Another point dealt with, was the decision of not to extend 
the possibility to take part to CPCs to the foreign citizens living in Italy, due to 
possible issues arising around diplomatic guarantees, when in third Countries. The 
associations asked for a stronger cooperation with MAECI which, as reported, 
was interested about the experimentation’s developments. Undersecretary Bobba 
then stressed the will to establish soon the Monitoring Committee and another 
time remarked the Volunteer’s security issue. 
The 28th of September, 2015, Cesare Tavella196, an Italian Cooperation 
expert working in Bangladesh, was murdered while jogging on the streets of 
Dhaka. DAESH claimed the actions, although no evidence was provided. 
Moreover, Bangladesh Government denied the existence of DAESH in the 
Country. On October the 3rd, 5 days later, a Japanese citizen was killed197 in a 
similar way and Bangladesh Authorities did not exclude connections with 
Tavella’s case.  
On October the 6th, 2015, the press agency ANSA declared to have received 
reliable information about the Italian Government’s ransom payment to Al-Nusra 
group, on the issue of Ramelli and Marzullo’s abduction. This, for an amount of 
about 11 millions Euros. The same day, the Government declared being 
evaluating the possibility of an Italian participation to the air bombing campaign 
against DAESH in Iraq. It was stressed how such an intervention would be an 
aswer to the request advanced by the Iraqi Government and, nevertheless, it would 
not be approved after a Parliamentary debate.  
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Always on October the 6th, 2015, the President of the Italian Republic 
Sergio Mattarella during an interview by the Russian press agency TASS198, 
declared how199, in order to “defeat the fundamentalist terrorism” is “needed a 
collaborative answer of all Countries within the International Community”, 
because “unilateral initiatives are unable to solve and adequately tackle the 
problem”. Moreover, he also added how “the fundamentalist terrorism is maybe 
the main frontier we will face in the next years. We need an answer entailing the 
use of force and a cultural answer too, to defeat the hate propaganda that, 
through the internet, is disseminated by the fundamentalist terrorism. I repeat, 
cooperation from everybody is needed. We need International collaboration with 
common strategies and actions. This is possible and essential because the danger 
is tremendous”. 
On the same day, the President reaffirmed the need of an effective 
international cooperation, able to stop the migration’s tragedies, while receiving 
the delegates to an interparliamentary forum dealing with “The role of 
Parliaments in the globalisation era: fundamental rights, democratic 
participation and development”200. 
The day after, October the 7th, he received the US Defence Secretary Ashton 
Carter, together with the Minister of Defence, Roberta Pinotti201, who on the 6th 
referred to the Defence Parliamentary Commissions on the situation of Italian 
Defence202. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE IMPLEMENTATION 
 
 
 
5.1 The use of force 
In this section, the shift from State Security to Human Security is seen in the 
evolution of State’s use of force and read through the lens of the Preamble to the 
UN Charter. It is deemed important to shed light on this evolution process, as a 
precondition for an aware cooperation of CPC as a tool for the promotion of 
positive peace, among the other State’s and International instruments for stability. 
 
5.1.1 A conceptual path  
The use of force is, maybe, the most debated issue within the HS discourse. 
The very first words of UN Charter’s preamble are: “We, the peoples of the 
United Nations, to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which 
twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind”, recognizing from the 
very beginning the tremendous grief given by war, mainly intended as interstate 
conflict, the kind of conflict which gave birth to the Humanitarian Law. This is 
quite self-evident given the circumstances, being the Charter written at the end of 
the most dreadful interstate war in the history of human kind. Thus the, climax, in 
its negative form, of the “Westphalian, State Security” paradigm. Other relevant 
provisions on the use of force, with reference to State Security, have been briefly 
discussed in the previous chapters. From this situation came the dichotomy of war 
or peace and State’s right of sovereignty, which is today widely challenged. 
Then the UN Charter goes on “to reaffirm faith in fundamental Human 
Rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men 
and women and of nations large and small”, dealing in this way with individual 
rights, planting  the seeds from which Human Rights Law flourished, aiming to 
freedom from fear and from want. But words are empty shells, without actions. 
So, the continuity in the conceptual path is given by the need to “establish 
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conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from 
treaties and other sources of international Law can be maintained”, entrusting to 
the States the responsibility to take care of the people within their borders, 
ensuring their Human Security, by establishing a sustainable peace. The 
Preamble’s first part, concludes by bestowing Member States with the duty “to 
promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom”, so to 
enact the promotion of a positive peace, a concept widely researched by Professor 
Antonio Papisca.  
Is all of that easy to achieve? Of course not. As it is often the case, things 
run slowly and changes are not fast to come. As known, after UDHR, the first 
binding HR Conventions on Civil, Political, Economic and Social Rights, were 
signed in 1966, 21 years after the UN Charter. So, what relevant sources of 
international Law, could have been maintained? What about States complying 
with IHRL Conventions and others not doing it? What about the gaps in rights 
implementation? The development of IHRL anyway went on, and the force had to 
be used in PKO, CMO, or “Military Operations Other Than War”, taking Allied 
States, cooperating in the same theatres of operations, to experience troubles 
while coordinating and conducting joint operations. All democracies face similar 
pressure but, due to the differences in their histories and institutions, they use 
force differently. One of the main points to be defined is “how the term ‘force’” 
when referred to organisations, is generally “reserved to statutory security forces 
and the term ‘violence’ to non‐state actors. This is not to deny that security forces 
can misuse force, and that violence used by ‘deviants’ may be regarded as 
legitimate. A riot, for instance, may be seen as the only option for marginalised 
groups to voice their dissent against the established order”. These considerations 
are drawn by an interesting analysis paper on the use of force, written by 
Cornelius Friesendorf203 for DCAF in Geneva. 
. 
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5.1.2. The use of force in CMOs, balancing IHL and IHRL provisions  
How can a Country enforce binding International Law, when partnering 
with another, not constrained by the same rules? Where lays the threshold of 
violence, between IHRL and IHL and vice-versa and what interpretations are to be 
applied?  Here is an example, borrowed by Friesendorf.  “The German approach 
was different from the US approach. During one surveillance operation a 
shepherd accidentally spotted KSK soldiers, who consequently had to abort the 
operation; when the Germans returned to camp, the US commanding officer 
scolded them for not killing the shepherd. Also, during joint German‐US 
operations the Germans would leave the arrest of suspects to their US comrades. 
Such reservations reflected different rules of engagement and definitions of 
military necessity”. The paper’s findings are how “US and Germany have had 
greater difficulties in calibrating levels of force to the problem at hand than the 
UK and Italy”. This also because US Forces were almost permanently postured 
towards the use of maximum force, employing Army and Marines assets.  
Although “The adoption of the COIN doctrine in 2009 put a premium on the 
discriminate and proportionate use of force. Yet, as US casualties soared, the US 
again showed a propensity for maximum force”. This, with the consequent 
“collateral damages”.  Due to its experiences in Northern Ireland, “The UK stood 
ready to employ maximum force”. “But in comparison to the US, the UK was 
better prepared for efforts against suspect criminals.” The paper recalls how UK 
intelligence and Special Forces assets were already highly cooperative and, when 
tasked on UK soil, the military assets are tried for ex-post evaluation. 
According to Friesendorf, Germany relied on “show of force”, facing heavy 
problems when dealing with riots in the Balkans, not trained for CRC, nor 
authorized to use deadly force. Also, in Afghanistan Germany wanted its military 
to operate within an IHRL frame, inadequate to the conflict situation on the 
ground. Even switching to IHL, “Germany remained a reluctant ally within 
NATO, imposing numerous caveats on its security personnel”. But, it is important 
to remark how: “Democracies must defend Human Rights. This means that the 
objectives of interventions, ranging from the stabilisation of war‐torn Countries to 
counterterrorism, do not justify all means. But important differences remain“. 
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5.1.3. The Italian way to use of force in CMOs 
In the Balkans, Italy “deployed combat forces, but the most outstanding 
Italian contribution was the deployment of the Carabinieri. Initially, they were 
hamstrung by the failure of commanders of regular military forces to understand 
Gerdarmeries”. “The Carabinieri have keenly exported the gendarmerie model, 
both in an executive capacity and by supporting host‐state police forces.” 
With regard to this, it is underlined: “NATO developed the Blue Box/Green 
Box concept, […] regular police forces or gendarmeries would hold command 
over the inner Blue Box and the military over the outer Green Box. The concept 
rendered the Carabinieri more effective by increasing their operational freedom. 
[…] by the year 2000, the MSU had resolved 261 out of 263 interventions without 
using force, relying on deterrence and negotiation instead.”. Also, “Carabinieri 
officers stressed their non‐martial posture and their method of striking up 
conversations with citizens as major assets in collecting information, practising 
what they called a ‘walk and talk’ policy”.  Friesendorf also states how “There is 
little systematic evidence that the Italian military has a competitive edge in using 
versatile force abroad, despite its significant domestic role in crime‐fighting .”  
Here a “fallacy” in his reasoning could be considered. To identify the role 
played by the military in the home territory as “crime-fighting”, thus investigative 
(“Polizia Giudiziaria”) or “Crowd and Riot Control” role, does not fit well. The 
Italian Military, the Army for the most part, is instead employed within national 
borders in a Puublic Security204 role (“vespri siciliani”, “operazione primavera”, 
“strade sicure”, “domino” and others). This role could overlap with CRC in some 
cases, but it is a different concept. This is why the Italian military did not show a 
“competitive edge” in crime-fighting as, generally speaking, in the Balkans they 
were tasked to ensure SASE and FOM, as prerequisites to enable the “Rule of 
Law” hence, crime-fighting, operations, usually conducted by the Carabinieri, as 
well as other Police and Gendarmerie Forces, with the support of the other 
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Military Forces. A statement from Senators Casini and Latorre205 shall be 
recalled: on another valuable feature of Italian Forces: “not only the military 
capabilities, but also the way to conduct missions, distinguished by strong 
impartiality among parties and a particular attention and sensitiveness towards 
civilian population needs and the humanitarian roles. With our example, we 
enabled the cooperation element to grow stronger”.  
Friesendorf then finds how: “In comparison to the US and Germany, Italy 
has a competitive edge in the application of versatile force. One reason for this is 
the experiences of the Italian Armed Forces in Law enforcement. The Armed 
Forces’ mission of protecting the national territory is generally understood as 
including Defence against internal threats.” 
But why does Italy have such a “competitive edge”, from where does it stem 
out? A possible explanation could be read in Ferdinando Sanfelice di 
Monteforte’s contribution to the WPD development process206. In his paper, he 
considers how “as a consequence of the migrations spanning through the 
centuries and due to its past division into multiple State entities, lasted almost two 
millennia, the population is influenced by different heritages and it’s considered 
vulnerable to an endemic instability”. Moreover, “the Italian State is constrained 
by internal security expenses, proportionally much higher than other European 
Countries, to the detriment of its external security funding”. Paradoxically, it 
could be considered how, due to its “endemic instability”, Italy had the possibility 
to develop a wide range of stabilisation forces and instruments, capable to apply 
the use (and most notably non-use) of minimum force in versatile ways and in 
different contexts, where the border between IHRL and IHL becomes blurred. 
And deadly dangerous, for those who are to apply minimum force. 
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5.1.4. The – incomplete? – evolution of the Italian Legal frame  
In the relationship between the State and its citizens, it has to be considered 
how, in the evolution from State Security paradigm into HS, the use of force by 
the State in front to its Citizens has radically changed. As well as the relationship 
between the State and its Forces’ personnel also changed.  
Attempting to draw an evolution of the Italian Military and Police Forces’ 
postures in Law Enforcement could be a slippery ground; nevertheless it is strictly 
intertwined with what above mentioned, in the “conceptual path”: resilience of 
Institutions to changes and “implementation gap”. Even face to the State’s 
Constitutional Law. Article 52207 of the Italian Constitution, already mentioned in 
previous chapters, sets out how “The organisation of the Armed Forces shall be 
based on the democratic spirit of the Republic” 
Art. 54: “All citizens have the duty to be loyal to the Republic and to uphold 
its Constitution and Laws. Those citizens to whom public functions are entrusted 
have the duty to fulfil such functions with discipline and honour, taking an oath”. 
Art.98 regulates: “The Law may set limitations on the right to become members of 
political parties in the case of magistrates, career military staff in active service, 
Law enforcement officers, […]” 
The Italian Criminal Law, “Codice Penale”, RD 1398/1930208, is known as 
“Codice Rocco”, by the name of Mussolini’s Minister of Justice, Alfredo Rocco. 
Articles 50 -55 of Criminal Code deal with legitimate defence, use of weapons, 
fulfilment of a duty, excess in defence and state of necessity. The “Single Act of 
Public Security Laws”, “TULPS”, RD 773/1931209 and   the Peacetime and 
Wartime Military Criminal Codes, RD 303/1941210, are relevant Laws still in 
force in Italy, although heavily amended, mainly by Constitutional Court rulings.  
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The first “Military Discipline Regulations” of the Republican Italy, were 
nevertheless published in 1964, then amended in 1978 and 1986. The current 
Military disciplinary set is finally given by the Legislative Decree 66/2010211, the 
“Code of Military Regulations”. Military Unions or Labour Organisations are not 
allowed, like in the majority of Countries; Law 382/1978212 “Tenets on Military 
Discipline”, anyhow, instituted the “Representation Councils”, dealing with 
welfare issues within Armed Forces. Law 121/81213 provided for the 
demilitarization of the State’s Police, “Polizia di Stato”, among other things, 
allowing enlistment of female personnel and unionization of the Force. 
The Italian Criminal Procedure Code, “Codice di Procedura Penale”, DPR 
447/1988214, switched the national judicial system from the inquisitorial to the 
adversarial one, implementing into domestic Law the relevant European and 
international provisions, including the ICCPR of 1966, 22 years later.  
Italy ratified the 2nd OP-ICCPR, on the abolition of the death penalty, in 
1995. Twelve years later, Constitutional Law 1/2007215 amended the Fundamental 
Law, thus totally erasing death penalty from the Republican Italy, as it was still 
foreseen by the Wartime Criminal Code. Italy signed the UN Convention against 
torture in 1985 and ratified it in 1989. In 2015, Italy still doesn’t have a Law 
foreseeing the crime of torture, although a Draft Law216 is currently being 
discussed between the two Chambers of the Parliament. The “Amnesty 
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International”217 web site, dealing with torture cases in Italy, puts in first place the 
events which took place during Genoa’s “G8” in July 2001 and, in second place, 
the death of Federico Aldovrandi, in 2005, which are later going to be refered to. 
A news article appeared on the “Corriere della Sera in June 2001, one 
month before the G8,”218 it dealt with the “Codice Rocco” depicting it as a “block 
to the freedom of expression, survived to the fascist culture. An instrument of 
social control useful to the Christian Democratic Party during cold war”. Then it 
goes on, quoting politicians and magistrates. Pinto: “in many cases incompatible 
with democracy”; Violante:”Reform must be discussed, as that Code is the 
remnant of a totalitarian era”; Rodotà “it’s paradoxical how this product of a 
totalitarian culture managed to survive”; Salvi: “Rocco Code is not the only 
problem”; in 2015, 14 years after these declarations, Royal Decree 1398/1930 is 
still in force. 
 
5.1.5. The evolution in Italian Law Enforcement 
Nevertheless, it is quite undeniable how a consistent evolution of Police 
Force’s stance, in a HS perspective, took place, deeply influencing Police Force’s 
organisation, education and training.  
A research paper by Maria Luisa Maniscalco, University “Roma Tre”, about 
“Making security between global and local, the Italian State Police officers’ 
opinions from a sociological field research” for the RIEAS, takes a picture of the 
change that, also in Italy, took Police approach from the State Security to the HS 
one. The research, published in 2011, ten years after Genoa’s G8, tells how “the 
role of the State Police is changed, and its members are seen as the “tutors” not 
only of the public order, but also of the community safety. Consequently, even the 
conception of “making security” itself is changed: no longer an order enforced 
from above, but an order built from the bottom, in the full collaboration with the 
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community and with the other police forces on the territory.”. Referring to HS 
concept, Maniscalco notices “a turnover of priorities as regards to the hierarchies 
of the referents of protection”, assuring “the supremacy of the protection of 
population against the defence of the State;” She also goes on by seeing a “a 
metamorphosis of the State and its action, that deeply affected the traditional role 
of military, police, judges and social operator”. In this context, “the main 
indicator of success of the Police doings is the capacity to conciliate the respect of 
liberties and individual rights and the “service” to the community, through the 
protection of institutions, Laws, security and public system”.  In the research, she 
sees “presence of two “ghosts”: the one of an extreme use of force and the 
inefficiency one.” The first “ghost” is imputed to a lack of understanding among 
parts of Police and parts of the Society, while the second comes from the 
decreasing funding. Anyway, the research’s conclusion states how Police, “Bent 
over the supremacy of the Community, it is engaged in the reaffirmation not only 
of the Law, but also of a “morality” of the threatened social bond.” 
Another article on the “Corriere della Sera” of the 25th of September, 
2015219, reported how Aldovrandi’s death “marked a point of no-return in the will 
of pretending respect for everybody from the Law Enforcement Forces.” and 
“despite the risk is still there, now it is harder to cover, or even only to delay, or 
to conceal, responsibilities for crimes committed by representatives of the 
Institutions, it doesn’t pay anymore”.  
In a meeting on the same day220, chaired by Senator Luigi Manconi, 
President of Senate’s “Commission for Human Rights promotion and protection” 
and Member of the Senate’s “Permanent Defence Commission”, with 
Aldovrandi’s mother and State Police’s representatives, the Mayor of Ferrara said 
how “the challenge of security is a tremendous one, therefore it needs great 
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investments in order to be efficient, in training, means and ethics”. In the same 
meeting, it was underlined how, due to Italian society’s stances, too often social 
problems are transformed into Police problems, but social solidarity is an 
unavoidable component of society’s security. A strong call to Police ethics 
emerged, coupled with the need of guaranteeing proper resources. With regard to 
both issues, the responsibilities of Politics was strongly remarked. Calls to the 
primacy of Politics had already been issued by the Military Representatives221. 
The already mentioned employment of the Armed Forces on the National 
territory prompted a new development in tactics and procedures, trying to 
combine the needs of combat to the needs of public security. The Italian Army, 
for instance, developed the “Metodo di Combattimento Militare”, “Military 
Combat Method”, MCM. In an interview to “Rivista Militare”222, the Italian 
Army’s Magazine, a 34 years old MCM instructor cadet declared: “The military 
personnel today is no more supposed only to stay into a trench, but also among 
the people. So, although dangers can come from everywhere, it is important to use 
force in a proportionate way”. The principle of “force escalation” is continuously 
stressed during theoretical studies and training.  
It seems also important to point out how this process complies with the 
“Guidelines on Human Rights Education for Law Enforcement Officials”, 
released by the OSCE: “The training for Armed Forces personnel – in addition to 
what is presented in the current guidelines – needs to address the important 
differences between conduct during hostilities and while carrying out Law 
enforcement tasks, as well as the applicable legal framework (i.e., international 
humanitarian Law versus Human Rights Law). In particular, training must ensure 
an appropriate change of the learner’s mind-set: from combat logic (“fight the 
enemy”) to Law enforcement logic (“serve and protect the population”)”. The 
same Guidelines stress how “there needs to be coherence between international 
Human Rights standards, national Laws and operational procedures. These 
                                                 
 
221
 “Si ai codici identificativi sui caschi degli agenti, ma solo dopo aver cambiato la legislazione 
sull'ordine pubblico” COCER GdF http://www.pianetacobar.eu/news/NewsDetail.aspx?Id=588 
222
 “Rivista militare”, 3/2015 http://www.esercito.difesa.it/comunicazione/editoria/Rivista-
Militare/Tutti-i-numeri/2015/Documents/RM-on-line-3-2015.pdf 
  83 
guidelines presuppose that Law enforcement services have developed operating 
rules and procedures that reflect International Human Rights standards.”  
Despite the above mentioned absence of the crime of torture in the Italian 
Juridical System, Police Forces’ are anyway informing their operational 
procedures to the highest IHRL standards. In this way, International guidelines223, 
become translated into National guidelines, for instance with regard to the 
protection of children224.But, as said before, the proper implementation of 
procedures needs resources. The guidelines (drafted also with a Carabinieri 
contribution) say: “Particular attention should be paid to the transformation of 
theoretical knowledge into operational, duty-related skills through relevant, 
Human Rights-related practical exercises”. It goes without saying how this 
entails, besides training procedures applied since basic education when joining 
Police Forces (as well as other organisations like, for instance, first aid personnel), 
an extensive, intensive and recurring retraining of the personnel already on duty, 
enlisted when HS concerns where not thoroughly considered (although, it is 
important to stress on this point, not disregarded). Without such an effort, as too 
many news stories unfortunately confirm225, every attempt to mainstream the 
respect to Human Dignity is going to be somehow disminished in its goals, the 
implementation of full HS, due to the lack of technical means and competence. 
It is also important to notice how Italy hosts many Excellence Institutions, 
widely recognised at the international leves, both military and civilian. Among 
them, the International Institute for Humanitarian Law226, the Center of 
Excellence for Stability Police Units227 and the NATO Defence College.   
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5.2 A new, shared cooperation in Human Security 
5.2.1. Human Security Mainstreamed into Defence 
As like as the Military Forces of other Countries, also the Italian ones are 
undergoing a deep transformation process towards a full “dual-use” capacity228, 
being this the possibility to be employed in non-military activities. The main 
operationalisation of this concept is the use of military assets in civil protection on 
the national territory, as well as in humanitarian and disaster relief outside the 
national borders and on the seas, as the Italian Navy has been doing. Furthermore, 
the acquisition of cross-cultural competences is more and more stressed, likewise 
a gender approach in the engagement of local populations during S&R CMO. 
Also, the CIMIC concept is evolving, as the “support to the mission” is conceived 
as not only civilian actors’ support to the military mission, but also as military 
support to civilian-led missions like, as said, natural disasters, Security Sector 
Reform, Training and Advising and others, including the protection of cultural 
sites229. This, coupled with the modernization of Italian Security Forces towards 
the full mainstreaming of HS within its policies, tactics and procedures. 
Even the US strategic thinking, within the “whole of Government 
approach”, seems to have acknowledged the need of military interventions 
supporting other instruments, instead of the opposite, as it happened. In a 2012 
paper, Christopher Holshek argued how230: “this calls for wider and deeper 
consultation and more collaborative, regional approaches than previously—and 
with hard power clearly ancillary to soft power, not vice-versa, as has been seen 
in Iraq and Afghanistan. It could therefore mean, as AFRICOM is instituting, a 
role for the military that is more supporting than supported (meaning civilian 
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leaders are in greater charge), and adopting non-military methods. Military 
planners can avoid negative outcomes by relying on the humanitarian ‘do no 
harm’ principle. First, military projects should complement the work of civilian 
organizations, rather than duplicating or ignoring it. Second, focusing on the 
long-term sustainability of projects will ensure that any goodwill generated does 
not quickly evaporate. Third, military forces should also target their efforts to 
areas in which they hold a comparative advantage, such as disaster relief, 
logistics, insecure environments.” 
Moreover, he goes on in what seems a call to redefine the concept of 
“military necessity” as conceived in IHL and applied by the US military thinking: 
“While one cannot expect a military operation to adhere to the NGOs’ values of 
neutrality, impartiality, and independence, the ‘do no harm’ philosophy can 
provide a helpful metric for evaluating outcomes from both a humanitarian and 
political standpoint”. It might be argued how this metric has been considered in 
cases like the bombing of MSF hospital in Kunduz, in October 2015. It is also 
correctly seen how: “Because of security, political and economic pressures, U.S. 
Government and military officials often attempt shorter-term, quick-impact 
development. The challenge is to design short-term programming that contributes 
toward long-term development”. And this, for sure, has not been an American-
only problem. In the same Study, W. J.Flavin appreciates how: “As a result of the 
events that unfolded since World War II, the U.S. has ended up with a large and well-
resourced military instrument of power that is out of proportion to the other 
instruments of power of the U.S. It is an instrument that can generate a great deal of 
capability and capacity and therefore has assumed many civil tasks over time”.  
Under a cultural awareness point of view, it is interesting to see how criticism 
was raised on how US forces planned their operations in Afghanistan and Iraq 
considering merely “State Security” concerns, based on the memory of 1991’s Gulf 
War. This took to the witnessed consequences, making US and, therefore, NATO 
military leaders more and more aware of the cultural aspects of COIN and S&R 
operations, at all levels, tactical, operational, strategic and political. Montgomery 
McFate wrote how “the value of military intelligence is exceeded by that of social and 
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cultural intelligence”231, expressing what should have been clear from the outset, that 
for carrying effective actions aimed to change a society, it is imperative to know and 
understand that society’s history, language, structures and values. These concerns 
have been inferred into military planning processes too, marking a shift; it could be 
said, towards a more qualitative approach232. NATO begun to include civilian experts 
into its planning processes, at all levels and different Nations, instituting the 
“knowledge development teams”233. Italy also begun to integrate the “selected 
reserve”234 Officers, enlisted due to their particular social, cultural and technical 
skills, in order to improve the awareness, understanding and planning possibilities. 
This shift in Strategic thinking, American, European and Italian, had also been 
observed by Professor Marco Mascia235 and shared to a wider public during the 
National Convention “La miglior Difesa è la Pace”236, “The best Defence is Peace”, 
which took place in Rimini from 13 to 15 February 2014. 
Other paragraphs by William Flavin shall be recalled, as resuming also the 
Italian situation, widely seen in the previous chapters: “Yet in all this, the military 
itself recognizes that the civil sector needs to be the final arbiter. The challenge is to 
operationalize the concept and engage with other agencies to achieve the best 
outcome”. “There are obstacles embedded in the […] Governmental system that work 
against the very coordination that is needed, however, to attempt to overcome these 
obstacles may require a significant political price; one that most are unwilling to pay. 
This presents a challenge because institutions are organized as stovepipes and are 
provided requisite authorities and funding that reinforce separation.” This shall be 
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seen as not too far from Undersecretary Bobba’s opinion about the lack of 
cooperation among Institutions (chapter 4.2). 
 
5.2.2. The DCNAN concepts 
 Chapter 3.3 briefly dealt with the DCNAN Committee and its studies. It 
seems important, after having considered the evolution in Defence, to go back to 
what the Committee concluded on the 30th of January, 2006237 in the paper “La 
Difesa civile non armata e nonviolenta”. It recalled Law 230/1998 on the Civilian 
Service as a form of Fatherland’s Defence autonomous and alternative from the 
Military one. Noting how the concept of National Defence was not clearly 
defined, it tried, anyway, to set it as “the complex of arrangements, measures and 
actions, military and civilian, allowing the Nation to prevent and face situations 
of crisis and emergency, internal and international, as well as armed conflict”. It 
went on by saying how “besides military defence the system foresees other forms 
of civilian defence in wide sense, including a non armed and nonviolent civilian 
defence”, leaving to others do define in practical terms this Defence, limiting to 
consider the conceptual contours. The Paper noted how similar wordings usually 
took different meanings in the civilian and in the military diction, making harder 
to achieve objectives which were nevertheless the same in priciples. It gave a 
resume about the different approaches on Defence by military and civilians. For 
military, peace was defined as “absence of violence”, with the military instrument 
to ensure deterrence and keep readiness, also for CMO/CRO. Crisis were seen as 
a tense situation, which may be composed or degenerate into war. The last one 
with different possibilities ranging from general war to PKO.  
 Civilian doctrine instead, although lacking in uniformity and etherogeneous 
in its components, was generally splitting interventions among ordinary and 
extraordinary, the last ones involving military means as a last resort. Moreover, 
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the paper noticed how in extraordinary interventions the civilian component was 
usually functional to the military one. Among other things, the Paper considered 
how it was not the best possibility to entrust civilian peacekeeping to SCN 
Volunteers only, due to the wide range of skills needed to efficiently perform such 
missions. The Paper then went on in tracing the origins of the DCNAN concept, 
going back to the Italian “Nonviolent Movement” and its “Ideological-
programmatic Charter”238, which included, among other “essential tools of 
nonviolent struggle”, the “formation of parallel Government bodies”. In 2014, a 
proposal for the political program of the Nonviolent Movement called for 
“unilateral disarmament and civil Defence239”. Moreover, it was observed as 
“DCNAN is not only alternative to armed Defence, more exactly it suggests to 
pursue more goals then the latter, which somehow stays in the background as a 
frame of reference which is considered outmoded and harmful”. On these 
contents among others, the Defence representative did not agree, as some of the 
principles were considered to be in contrast with the Constitution and other Laws. 
The Paper took in exam the concept of “Popular Nonviolent Defence”, “Difesa 
Popolare Nonviolenta”, DPN, admitting how it was “unknown outside a narrow 
community of experts”, not having anyway a common and shared definition even 
among them. Furthermore, it observed “skepticism on the possibility to influence 
decisions by pacifist and nonviolent movements”, also due to the “deep 
economical and political interests revolving around the military-industrial 
complex”.Anyhow, as fifth “field of intervention” for a DPN, the CPC were cited. 
 On the following steps, the Paper deemed the SCN as indipendent from the 
DPN and saw in its design a predominance of Article 52 of the Constitution on 
Article 11, “especially considering the dominant tendency to consider Defence 
only within security policies”. It considered so the SCN as a “sure institutional 
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way of civilian Defence and a priority application field of DCNAN”, noting a 
“scarce capacity to form and inform about this feature of SCN” and seeing it as 
“losing its appearance of contrast against the military apparatus and the use of 
armed force”.The Paper then concluded by recommending the experimentation of 
nonviolent ways of conflict transformation, from which the first istitutionalised 
CPC experience in 2011 begun. 
  
5.2.3. Possibility for a shared and cooperative cultural  evolution 
 In October 2005, three months before the release of the DCAN document, 
Professor Francesco Tullio drafted a Paper240 for the meeting of a State’s Police 
Union, on “Terrorism and Civil Defence”. In his paper he advocated a pragmatic 
approach to DCNAN, instead of a too biased one, insisting on words and ethical 
concepts, defined in a negative form (“Non Armed and Nonviolent”), leading 
ultimately to the loss of the “engagement into dialogue”. He proposed to remark 
less the ideological premises, pushing efforts into dialogue on operational issues. 
The Paper dealt, among other things, with the policies a State can adopt in facing 
social difficulties within its borders, which usually lead to repression or 
democraticization, the former related in the text with Genoa’s G8, the latter with 
transparency of the Institutions and public debate. Among the conclusions, he 
stated how “the basic emotions of war, being aggression and fear, can be 
developed till reckless exaltation or into protestant pacifism, coward and passive 
(not referring of course to Gandhi’s and King’s pacifism), or again shall be 
integrated into a realistic and functional Defence project”. He than asked to put 
aside political colour’s differences, which only lead to polarization and thus 
detrimental to DCNAN objectives, setting up a dialogue also with the Armed 
Forces, on a Civilian Defence leading a transformation of violence into a positive 
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assertivity.   
As previously seen, the DCNAN Paper was partly disagreed by the Defence 
representatives, showing dialogue misunderstanding at least. A Paper presented at 
the “Conference on Missing Narratives for Ending Wars”, by Tom Matyók241, 
dealt with addressing “the limitations of cost-benefit analysis in communicating 
the full human drama of war” as a tool for nonviolent advocacy, arguing how 
“Peace activists contributed to their marginalization by refusing to address the 
call to war with clearly thought out arguments based on rational analysis; rather 
than, solely anti-war emotion. The peace movement was against the war, but they 
could not communicate the peace they favored. The peace movement handed 
narrative hegemony to those shouting the loudest, War!”. What if such 
considerations lately became part of US and other Countries’ estimates or not, 
seeing the reluctance to engage into new military-only “adventures”.  
In another Paper commissioned by the DCNAN Committee, “Study on 
peacekeeping and peace research civilian education activities” , 2008242, Doctor 
Andrea Valdambrini summarized, among the other findings of his work, some 
more differences between military and civilian education and training. Some of 
them are of course still valid, others might need to be revised.  
In particular, he considered how “military systems” saw a dichotomy 
between “peace” and “war”, as security imposed by weapons guaranteed peace. In 
a “State Security” paradigm, as it was until the Gulf War, it was maybe like that, 
but recent operations demonstrated how political peace agreements, in order to be 
sustainable, need a broad range of instruments and the military can be only one of 
them. To win war proved to be quite easy, to win peace proved to be impossible 
for “military tools” only and even for military supported by “civilian tools”, due 
to the complexity of conflicts and the need to operate for very long time lapses to 
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transform them. The possibility to use weapons for military actors was for sure 
obvious, but after 2010, many missions conducted by Italian Forces deployed 
non-armed personnel, into training and assistance strenghtening efforts like 
MIADIT243, “Missione Addestramento Italiana”, “Italian Training Mission”. A 
kind of employment expressely recalled in the WPD, taking place in Gibuti, 
Somalia, Libia and Palestine among others. In the way to conceive “conflict” and 
“security”, Valdambrini recalled the “Police State” expression. In Police Forces’ 
Doctrine, the idea of “public order” gave more and more field to “public 
security”, marking the shift from State to Human Security. This, despite proper 
and recurring training of personnel, as well as supply of proper equipments, 
remain an issue, due to funding constraints. Valdambrini also argued how 
miliitary had, generally speaking, a monodisciplinary education, while giving 
room to the possibility that nonviolent contents like negotiation and cross-cultural 
competence, inferred into the military apparatus by new experiences, could 
prompt a “reverse contamination”, generating structural changes. 
Due to what discussed in the previous chapters, it shall be considered how a 
structural change took and has being taking place, non only in Defence, but also 
and more importantly within the whole of the State’s organisation. By bearing in 
mind all of that, the discourse aimed to demonstrate how the conditions required 
by an agreed or willing cooperation among State’s Institutions and CSO/NGO 
are, in general terms, largely achievable. It is useful to recall the principles of the 
“Barcelona Report”244 for a “HS Doctrine for Europe”: “the primacy of Human 
Rights, clear political authority, multilateralism, a bottom-up approach, regional 
focus, the use of legal instruments, and the appropriate use of force.”, which seem 
to be almost in place, of course needing appropriate tuning. And the reasons for 
this Doctrine: “morality”, “legality” and “enlightened self-interest”. 
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5.3 Coordinating organisations into Human Security 
The Barcelona Report envisioned the creation of a European “HS Response 
Force”, including military, police, HR monitors, development, humanitarian and 
administration experts, as well as Volunteers, aimed to “improve early warning, 
intelligence gathering, mobilisation of local support, implementation and 
sustainability” to achieve sustainable peace.  
The tools existing to handle CMO are nowadays wider and more specialised 
than in 2004, when the “Report” has been written, as much better are the 
coordination mechanisms. At the European level, the main shortfall is, in an 
indirect way, the “clear political authority”, given by the mentioned lack of 
generalised consensus on the actions to conduct. Generally speaking, this has a 
consequence, at least in 2015’s reality, being how every Nation has to develop its 
own instruments and capacities, although seeking to integrate them in a wider 
European framework. 
 The “bottom-up approach” is, by itself, the most widely recognised deficit 
of military organisations. In the National Convention on the WPD245, Professor 
Luciano Bozzo argued how “military hierarchical-pyramidal structure is heritage 
of the subordinated organisational model of industrial society […], antithetic to 
the logic governing contemporary advanced societies, evident in the cyber 
dimension: networked, coordinated, decentred and, so, polycentric”. Although 
such a vision shall be regarded as already partly outdated, it is possible to see a 
connection between this and what stated in the WPD, point 92: “The identification 
of lessons learned and the preparation of suitable doctrinal and operational 
responses, as well as the subsequent adaptation of means and systems, has not 
been as rapid, effective and precise as expected. Improvement of these activities is 
essential to make operations even more successful”.  
NGO/CSO, on the contrary are, at least in general, extremely fast in 
organisational learning, also due to the thin size of the organisations. Their 
problem, on the contrary, is “fare rete”, to “network”, to coordinate among 
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organisations, so to share lessons identified/learned and best practices. The 
Barcelona Report envisions the figure of the “HS Officer”, putting Human 
Dignity before State’s concerns, knowing and respecting IHRL, IHL and ICL, 
aware of conflict’s gender dimensions and “maintaining the military spirit of 
sacrifice, heroism, discipline and excellence but combining it with the civilian 
spirit of listening, individual responsibility, empathy and enabling others”.  This, 
weighing the “considerable cultural shift both for the military and civilians”, 
widely debated in the previous chapters, pondering how “this shift is best 
achieved through training and joint exercises”.  
The image below (Figure N.5) shows the levels of interaction among 
organisations, following NATO’s CA. There are, anyway, other levels of 
interaction, but on a negative scale, being “unawareness”, “indifference”, “non-
dialogue” and “hostility”. Chief of UN OCHA CMCoord Section, Josef 
Reiterer246, during a webinar with NATO CCOE247 on the 14th of August, 2015, 
said: “learned the hard way how hard is to liaise with other actors in the field, in 
Sierra Leone, when we called for a meeting and just nobody showed up, because 
nobody cared about coordination… Of course, we were all there to help the same 
people”. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: NATO CIMIC Handbook “There is a need for a CA using Civil-Military Interaction”248 
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5.3.1. Basic Education and training of SCN and CPC within an Italian ANMD 
Of course, when dealing with Italian CPC, “integration” it is not the best 
solution, as considered in previous chapters. Anyhow, when operating in areas 
where different National components are engaged, at least “awareness” should 
have to be ensured. The point of departure of Italian CPC is, as seen, the SCN.  
The SCN’s training guidelines, briefly mentioned in chapter 3.2, have been issued 
on proposal of the DCNAN Committee and are still today a document of high 
moral and practical Value, recalling the “ties among the consociates, finalised to 
the achievement of a better social cohesion in the frame of Constitutional 
freedoms, the struggle against inequalities and social injustices, the 
hold/reconstruction of binds among citizens and between them, the Republican 
Institutions and the State”.  
In the light of the developments occurred in military and Law enforcement 
doctrines and employment, it does not appear unreasonable to find out whether 
there shall be room to give to SCN Volunteers an awareness of what are the 
objectives, policies and means of military and Law enforcement services. 
Referring to the documents analysed in the previous chapters, in SCN’s training 
programs there are references to the origins of SCN from the conscientious 
objection to Military Service, but the role of military and police services 
nowadays is not mentioned. This, with particular reference to the dual-use 
capabilities for the military and protection of human dignity for police.  Vice-
versa, it shall be considered to give to these services’ personnel awareness of 
SCN capabilities and employment. During the 25th of September meeting dealt 
with in Chapter 5.1.4.249, the introduction of e-learning capabilities within Police 
Forces was mentioned. It shall be a fast, cheap and immediate way to spread this 
kind of awareness, which should anyhow be included also in the basic training 
courses. 
Of course, more specific instruction and/or training activities shall be 
considered and conducted, taking into account the employment of SCN or CPC 
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personnel, in Italy and abroad, as it is anyhow already done. Maybe, pending a 
further evolution in Doctrine, Law, training and specialisation, of which the seeds 
perhaps have already been planted, the Civilian Service will not be seen any more 
as a form of Defence alternative to the military one, on the contrary, the Military 
Defence will be considered as a Specialised form of an “Active Civil Defence”, 
equipped and structured to stop the worst forms of violence. This, as already 
considered also by the WPD (see chapter 2.3). A good point of discussion could 
be seen into what the CDS, General Claudio Graziano, said to the Defence 
Commission of the Chamber of Deputies, on the 5th of August, 2015250, with 
regard to the Military training system: “It’s about finding integrations on all 
Armed Forces’ common activities […] and also an important re-evaluation of the 
CASD (“Centro Alti Studi Difesa”), the Defence High Studies Centre, not only as 
a military thinking and doctrinal hub, but also for security in a broad sense and 
more focused on international exchange”. Dealing with CPC, it shall be of some 
interest for CPC development to consider taking part to such a “hub”, in order to 
be better prepared to handle the complex linkages and interactions that CPC will 
have on the ground, via preventive planning. 
 
5.3.2. The multifaceted interactions of CPC in CP and CMO 
The Ministerial Decree 07/05/2015251, makes reference to EU Reg. 
230/2014252, Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP). It is deemed 
important to deal with its provisions, as the Decree states how, beginning from the 
second year, the experimentation shall be extended to IO Italy is being part. IcSP 
Thematic Strategy Paper 2014-2020253 explicitly states how:  
- “The primary aim of EU assistance […] is, on the one hand, to prevent 
conflicts, build peace and to build crisis preparedness capacities”;  
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- “The IcSP is primarily a development and cooperation instrument. This 
means that it can only address conflict prevention, peace-building and 
security issues in so far as they hamper development and other 
cooperation objectives of the EU with non-developing Countries .”; 
- “IcSP support should be based on a shared assessment and a common 
objective, which combines in the most efficient manner all relevant EU 
external policy instruments and tools”; 
In an Italian ANMD/EU CA perspective, it seems useful to try to forecast 
the most relevant actors the CPC will have to interact with, taking for granted 
local NGO/CSO/CBO, as paramount to the objective of building local capacities 
through local ownership: administrative authorities; judiciary authorities; 
economic actors; police and military, maybe militias and non-state actors; 
refugees, migrants, host communities, ex-combatants; educational system 
personnel; health system personnel; civilian protection and civilian Defence 
assets; religious actors. 
In the same way, depending the area of intervention, the CPC could have to 
operate with: SSR mission’s personnel, civilian, judiciary and police; DDR 
mission’s personnel, military, police and judiciary; other strengthening/capacity 
building military or police personnel; humanitarian actors, ICRC, UN, EU; 
Development Cooperation actors, including profit firms; diplomatic personnel, 
religious missions.  
It goes without saying how, as recalled many times, the fundamental CPC 
feature in order to be effective, is the participative approach, so living among the 
local people. Anyhow, depending the cases, forms of coordination should or, 
better said, will have to be established. Setting aside the situations already 
considered in the previous chapters, like “do not harm approach consultant to 
development NGO” let’s consider a hypothetical case. 
A CPC intervention has, among its tasks, the social reintegration of ex-
combatants. Shall be useful for the CPC operators to know, in quite good details, 
facts and figures about the organisation/militia/non-state actor to which the ex-
combatants belonged, in order to establish proper narratives for both ex-
combatants and host communities, facilitating this reintegration process? Many 
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actors could lend CPC proper information about that, setting aside OSINT 
including judiciary investigations made public): local institution, police/armed 
forces, international police mentoring the local forces are among them and a 
structured contacts network shall for sure be useful.  
A more practical example: in case ex-combatants are undergoing 
disarmament and demobilisation process, assisted by an International DDR 
mission, shall it be useful to set pre-established communication channels, through 
which to inform CPC about the arrival of ex-combatants in the area, with a 
reasonable anticipation?  
Another example. CPC operators acquire information about two girls who 
went away from a village or an IDP camp, “as word of mouth said”, to be forced 
into prostitution in another Country. To inform local police? What if it’s 
unreliable, unable or unwilling? To inform the other Country’s police? Directly, 
through international police presence, through diplomatic channels? Is there a 
EUROPOL presence in the Country?  
Just some simple cases, which may not be of primary concern of CPC 
operators, nevertheless, shall be a strong contribution from CPC in better 
accomplishing other’s tasks and, vice versa, enhance CPC awareness and 
efficiency. It could be regarded as opportune how the “external relations” of CPC 
should be handled by some of the association’s “staff”, instead of the operators 
“on the ground”, in order to preserve their legitimacy, neutrality, impartiality and, 
most important, giving them the time to stay among the people in conflicts to be 
positively transformed. Another consideration. MAECI considered how 
Development Cooperation operators are often “the only National presence on the 
ground”, praising the value of this presence, in having a proper situational 
awareness. With a CPC institutionalisation, CPC operators will also be on the 
ground, possibly in an even more embedded way. It shall be deemed useful to 
have at least association’s staff members addressed on the best ways to send and 
receive relevant information, from and to MAECI’s structures, with the aim of 
improving the overall awareness and, thus, security. 
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5.3.3. Training CPC in a European perspective 
The Ministerial Decree above mentioned, foresees at least 100 basic training 
hours, in Italy, and 70 hours in the intervention area. The Draft Law foresees at 
least 400 training hours. Pending the experimentation which is, by definition, a 
temporary way to do things, it shall be considered to prepare CPC operators, at 
least for a part of their training, according to European standards. And here comes 
the issue of not having, up to now, a European CPC so, on paper, there should be 
no training standards. This is in a certain way true, but some more considerations 
can be done.    
Setting aside the specific training programs elaborated up to now, which are 
of course good and validated by the positive experiences of ICP, it could be 
evaluated whether to gain access, at least for some of the “association’s staff”, to 
the “Europe’s New Training Initiative for Civilian Crisis Management” (ENTRi) 
network.254 These courses are mainly designed for civilian personnel to be 
deployed in EU CMO, so for employments different from the CPC ones. 
Nevertheless, to have staff personnel more aware of the “big picture” could 
enhance CPC efficiency within the ANMD/CA overall frame, not last by 
establishing personal contacts. The acronyms here are used together, as it is quite 
easy to imagine how the most part of CPC interventions will be in places where 
other nations and the same EU are already present. The EU training provider in 
Italy255 is, in 2015, the “Scuola Sant’Anna”, in Pisa, providing “pre-deployment”, 
“Human Rights” and “Hostile Environment Awareness Training – HEAT”256 
courses. The last one, in particular, is interesting as providing survival, medical, 
orientation and counter-IED skills, among the others. These are skills usually 
taken for granted for the military, but not for civilian personnel and are 
                                                 
 
254
 See note 110 
255
 ENTRi Certification Database – Award of the C³MC Label 
http://www.entriforccm.eu/certification/certified-courses.html 
256
 Course concept for the SPECIALISATION COURSE ON: HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT 
AWARENESS TRAINING (HEAT) 
http://www.entriforccm.eu/certification/assets/pdf/Course_Concept_Hostile_Environment_Aware
ness_Training.pdf 
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nevertheless useful in degraded environments and tricky situations. 
Taking into account the, not unjustified, concerns about security widely 
mentioned in the previous chapters, acquiring these skills won’t be wasted time 
for CPC operators, as well as for Development Cooperation personnel257. HEAT 
course, in its practical phases, is managed by personnel of the 1st Carabinieri 
Regiment “Tuscania”, based in Livorno (very close to Pisa, where is the 
“Sant’Anna School”). With the intention of providing CPC personnel with similar 
skills, it could be pondered the idea of involving more national realities in a wider 
system, inspired by the Pisa (Sant’Anna) – Livorno (Tuscania) one, also outside 
the European frame, if for “certification” issues it could prove impracticable. For 
instance, CPC from Emilia shall take advantage of a partnership between the 
Bologna University and the “Friuli” Airmobile Brigade of the Army; CPC from 
Veneto, of a partnership between the Padua University and the “Lagunari” 
Regiment in Venezia; CPC from Trentino Alto Adige/South Tyrol, of an 
association Trento University – 7th Carabinieri Regiment “Trentino Alto Adige”. 
And so on, taking advantage of the capillary distribution of Universities and 
Military Units on the National territory.  
In stressing how such experiences will not be (as they are not in any of the 
ENTRi initiatives) neither “armed”, nor “violent”, but just skills-inferring, these 
may have a number of “side effects”, caused by a positive interaction among 
military, police and civilian actors in Italy, instead than directly on the field. Such 
a discourse would be beneficial for raising awareness and prompt a faster and 
more efficient functional coordination, when needed, in the field. Within the 
ANMD/CA anyway, the practical autonomy of CPC interventions shall never be 
questioned, otherwise their very sense and usefulness would be wiped out.  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
257
 Aggiornamento professionale alla DGCS 
http://www.cooperazioneallosviluppo.esteri.it/portaledgcs/portaledgcs/Documentazione/AltriDocu
menti/Quaderni%20Cooperazione%202015-1-13.pdf 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
What considered in this dissertation have the scope of giving an account of 
the evolution of the Civil Peace Corps concept in Italy and its situation, up to the 
8th of October, 2015. The reform efforts Italy has been advancing, with great 
sacrifices especially for some parts of its population, in the last 8 years of 
economic crisis and growing tensions are, as it seems, beginning to give positive 
results, although of course so much still has to be done. Among these results, a 
renewed assertiveness of the Country in the International arena is a very positive 
novelty, as in the post-second world war era, it has been much more pushed by the 
events, instead of pushing them. An assertiveness, anyway, not guided by an old-
fashioned way of dominance-inspired logics, led instead by a firm adherence to 
the principles and practices of International Law. Such an evolution will, 
hopefully, prompt a new sentiment of National Unity based on shared values 
among its population, allowing in this way the unity of efforts, required by a 
society, in order to work properly and to effectively implement a Human Security 
environment for all. Moreover, it will enable to project Power outside the Italian 
borders, in its most important shape, a moral power, able to positively influence 
the course of the events, knowing how an increased well-being of sisters and 
brothers, near and far, is directly linked and intertwined to everybody’s existence. 
As tremendously tragic experiences showed and are showing, other courses of 
action are unavoidably condemned to crushing failures, with all their charge of 
blood, sorrow, tears and, worst of all, hate. In this situation, hoping and working 
for the greater good for our world, as also set by the General Assembly of the 
United Nations, among the contributions Italy can give, there will be the Civil 
Peace Corps. 
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ACHRONYMS 
 
 
AICS IT Agenzia Italiana per la Cooperazione allo Sviluppo, Italian Agency for 
Development Cooperation 
AISE IT Agenzia Informazioni e Sicurezza Esterna, External Security Agency 
AISI IT Agenzia Informazioni e Sicurezza Interna, Internal Security Agency 
ANMD IT Approccio Nazionale Multi-Dimensionale alla gestione delle crisi, 
National Multi-Dimensional Approach to crisis management 
Art. Article (of Law) 
CA Comprehensive Approach 
CASD IT Centro Alti Studi Della Difesa, High Defence Studies Centre 
CBO Community Based Organisations 
CDS Chief of Defence Staff, IT Capo di Stato Maggiore della Difesa 
CMO Crisis Management Operation 
CCOE CIMIC Centre of Excellence 
CCP Corpi Civili di Pace, Italian for CPC 
CEPOL European Police College 
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy 
CIMIC Civilian-Military Cooperation 
CICS IT Comitato Interministeriale per la Cooperazione allo Sviluppo, 
Interministerial Committee for Development Cooperation 
CISR IT Comitato Interministeriale per la Sicurezza della Repubblica, 
Interministerial Committee for the Security of the Republic 
CMO Crisis Management Operation/s 
CM Crisis Management 
CMO Crisis Management Operation 
CMCoord Civilian-Military Coordination 
CNCS IT Consiglio Nazionale per la Cooperazione allo Sviluppo, National 
Council for Development Cooperation 
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COCER IT Consiglio Centrale di Rappresentanza, Military Representation 
Council 
COI IT Comando Operatiovo Interforze, Jount Operations Headquarters 
COIN Counter Insurgency 
COPACO IT Comitato Parlamentare di Controllo sui Servizi Segreti, Parliamentary 
Control Committee on the Secret Services 
COPASIR IT Comitato Parlamentare per la Sicurezza della Repubblica, 
Parliamentary Committee for the Security of the Republic 
CoPS IT Comitato Politico Strategico, Political-Strategic Committee 
CP Conflict Prevention 
CPC Civilian Peace Corps, IT Corpi Civili di Pace, CCP  
CPI Civilian Peace Interventions, IT Interventi Civili di Pace 
CPS German Civil Peace Service 
CRC Crowd and Riot Control 
CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy 
CSO Civil Society Organisation/s 
DA Delegated Authority, IT Autorità Delegata 
DAESH English translitteration of Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, AR ad-
Dawla al-Islāmiyya fī al-ʿIrāq wa l-Shām, يف ةيملاسلإا ةلودلا 
ماشلاو قارعلا 
DCAF Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces 
DCNAN IT Difesa Civile Non Armata e Nonviolenta, Civilian Defence Not Armed 
and Nonviolent 
DDR Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration 
DFID  Department for International Development – UK 
DGCS IT Direzione Generale per la Cooperazione allo Sviluppo, Directorate 
General for Development Cooperation 
DIS IT Dipartimento Informazioni per la Sicurezza, Department of 
Information for Security 
D.Lgs. IT Decreto Legislativo, Legislative Decree 
DPCM IT Decreto del Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri, PM’s Decree 
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DPKO Department of Peace Keeping Operations 
DPN IT Difesa Popolare Nonviolenta, Popular Nonviolent Defence 
DPR IT Decreto del Presidente della Repubblica, Presidential Decree 
DRR Disaster Risk Reduction 
ECHO EU Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection department 
ECPC European Civilian Peace Corps 
EEAS European External Action Service 
EIDHR Instrument for democracy and human rights worldwide 
ENTRi Europe’s New Training Initiative for Civilian Crisis Management 
EPLO European Peacebuilding Liaison Office 
EWS Early Warning System 
EU European Union 
EUROPOL European Police Office 
FOM Freedom of Movement 
FRONTEX Frontières extérieures, French for "external borders" 
GO Governmental Organisation 
HEAT Hostile Environment Awareness Training 
HR Human Rights 
HRD Human Rights and Democracy 
HR/VP High Representative / Vice President 
HS Human Security 
IcSP Instrument contributing to stability and peace 
IDP Internally Displaced People 
IGO Inter Governmental Organisation 
IHL International Humanitarian Law 
IHRL International Human Rights Law 
ICL International Criminal Law 
ICC International Criminal Court 
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ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross 
IED Improvised Explosive Device 
IO International Organisation 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
ISAF International Security Assistance Force 
IT Information Technology 
JOC Joint Operations Room, IT Sala Operativa Interforze 
KSK DE Kommando SpezialKräfte, German Special Operations Forces 
MAE IT Ministero degli Affari Esteri, MoFA 
MAECI Ministero degli Affari Esteri e della Cooperazione Internazionale, MoFA 
& Development Cooperation 
MCM IT Metodo Combattimento Militare, Military Combat Method 
MIADIT IT Missione Addestramento Italiana, Italian Training Mission 
MED Ministry of Economic Development, IT Ministero dello Sviluppo 
Economico 
MEF Ministry of Economy and Finance, IT Ministero dell’Economia e delle 
Finanze 
MIUR IT Ministero dell’Istruzione, dell’Università e della Ricerca, Ministry of 
Education, University and Research 
MoD Ministry of Defence, IT Ministero della Difesa 
MoFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs, IT Ministero degli Affari Esteri 
MoI Ministry of Interior/Internal Affairs, IT Ministero degli Interni 
MoJ Ministry of Justice, IT Ministero della Giustizia 
MoL Ministry of Labor, IT Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali 
MS  Member State/s 
MSU Multinational Specialized Unit, Military Force on Police Duty of NATO 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NISP IT Nucleo Interministeriale Situazione e Pianificazione, Interministerial 
Situation and Planning Group 
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NCMO  National Crisis Management Organisation 
NGO Non Governmental Organisation/s, IT ONG Organizzazioni non 
Governative 
OAS Organisation American States 
OCHA Office Coordination Humanitarian Affairs 
OCSE-DAC Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe - Development 
Assistance Committee 
OP Optional Protocol 
OSINT Open-Source Intelligence 
PCM IT Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, Presidency of the Council of the 
Ministers 
PKO Peace Keeping Operations 
PM Prime Minister, IT Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri 
PSC  Political Security Committee 
RD IT Regio Decreto, Royal Decree 
RIEAS Research Institute for European and American Studies 
ROL Rule of Law 
SASE Safe And Secure Environment 
SCN IT Servizio Civile Nazionale, National Civilian Service, sometimes also 
referred as “Civil Service” in the text. 
S&R Stability and Reconstruction 
SSR Security Sector Reform 
TEU Treaty of the European Union 
TULPS IT Testo Unico delle Leggi di Pubblica Sicurezza,  Single Act of Public 
Security Laws 
UDC IT Unità di Crisi, MoFA Operations Room 
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
UN United Nations 
UNDP United Nations Development Programme 
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees  
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UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund 
US United States of America 
UNSG United Nations Secretary General 
UNSC United Nations Security Council 
UNTSO United Nations Truce Supervision Organization 
UNDP United Nations Development Program 
UNV United Nations Volunteers 
UK United Kingdom 
WB World Bank 
WPD White Paper of Defence, IT Libro Bianco della Difesa 
ZDF DE Zivilier Friedensdienst, German Civil Peace Service 
ZIF DE Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze, German Center for 
International Peace Operations 
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